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Preface
This study was completed within the framework of the project ‘Reforms and Interests in an
Enlarged Union’, which is part of the second phase of the interdisciplinary Research Group
Eastern Europe (FOROST).1 This is financed by the Bavarian Ministry for Science, Research
and Art and concerns itself with issues of EU enlargement. In total thirty nine research initia-
tives at four Bavarian universities and two research institutes have been or are supported. The
central focus of the project ‘Reforms and Interests in an Enlarged Union’ is on the varying
and comparative interests of individual European states in an enlarged EU, in particular the
intensified distribution conflicts.
The last enlargement round changed the character of the Union from a club of relatively
rich states to a heterogeneous group of states with an increased weighting of poorer countries.
Distribution conflicts over tighter financial resources will intensify. Because the EU has not
yet reached its final extended configuration, and almost only ‘poor relations’ still stand before
the door, questions of interest equalisation and institutional encumbrance take on ever more
critical importance.
A possible EU accession of Turkey does not stand at the centre of the ‘Reforms and Inter-
ests’ project, however it already radiates a powerful influence on the present discussion within
the Union and on its current enlargement phase. The issue of costs for additional enlargement
rounds is not only of great interest because of its topicality. This already overshadows the
2004 enlargement and the positioning of individual states regarding the reshaping of EU in-
stitutions. It also influences disputes over decision-making processes, fiscal distribution con-
flicts, and connected reforms in the most expenditure-rich policy areas. These are also key
themes in the broader project. It is clear that the EU is at a crossroads: the means, approach
and speed of future enlargement have become strategic questions on the future configuration
of the Union – and of Europe.
Munich, November 2004
Hermann Clement
                                                
1 The study is also partly based on earlier works by Wolfgang Quaisser and Alexandra Reppegather (2004) and
Wolfgang Quaisser (2004a and 2004b). It is available for download from the FOROST site at (www.forost.de)
or the Osteuropa-Institut, München, site at (www.oei-muenchen.de). This is the final version (as of 11 November
2004).
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Summary and Conclusions
‘EU membership for Turkey’ is a strategic-foreign policy project. By this means the goal of
‘political union’ will be conclusively rescinded in favour of the vague vision of a ‘global
power Europe’. If such a development occurs, the European Union may degenerate into a
‘European United Nations’ or elevated free trade zone, in the framework of which interstate
coordination increases and integration cores, variable according to national interests, will
form. Not more, rather less security in Europe, could be a consequence. On grounds on self-
preservation the EU should first pursue its own consolidation, undertaking additional en-
largements only gradually and conditionally, and develop alternatives to full membership for
strategic partners.
Before negotiations on EU membership can begin, Turkey must, like any other candidate,
fulfil the political criteria specified at Copenhagen in 1993 (‘Copenhagen Criteria’). Before
accession can occur there are also economic preconditions: a functioning market economy
and the capacity to withstand competition. It will take many years before Turkey can attain
the competition criterion. In its overall level of economic development Turkey is comparable
with Bulgaria and Romania. However the specific problems are different and the situation is
worsened by regional disparities larger than anywhere in the EU.
The political criteria may present a greater hurdle. While the AKP (Justice and Develop-
ment Party) government is focused on the goal of EU membership and seems set on a reform
course required to achieve this, Turkish political culture will not metamorphose overnight. De
facto shortcomings in political, civil and legal rights and freedoms persist. Important as it is,
formal legal progress – most recently the penal code reform – cannot immediately change
this.
Whatever the perceived strategic necessities of further binding Turkey into the western
democratic community, the EU would contravene its own rules and principles if a political as-
sessment by the European Commission (hereafter ‘Commission’) and/or Council enabled ne-
gotiations to begin before the requirements were completed. Despite these formal restrictions,
it is probable that on the bases of the Commission’s recommendation, a heightened awareness
of Turkish efforts, and powerful foreign policy influences, the EU heads of state and govern-
ment will decide to commence accession negotiations. Because no EU states or institutions
could condone a dilution in communal democratic principles, a protracted process can be
reckoned with. The greater socio-economic disparity between Turkey and the EU-15 will ne-
                                                
* Wolfgang Quaisser is Senior Research Fellow, Osteuropa Institut in Munich, Germany; e-mail:
quaisser@lrz.uni-muenchen.de. ** Steve Wood is Research Fellow at the National Europe Centre,
Australian National University, e-mail: stephen.wood@anu.edu.au
Arbeitspapier Nr. 25
8
cessitate a lengthier negotiation period than that which occurred with the states of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEECs). The Commission has signalled that this process will be an open-
ended one with an outcome that cannot be pre-determined.
The EU must also seriously consider whether an earlier inclusion of Turkey would not
overextend its (the EU’s) integrative capacities, particularly when it is already under great
pressure to successfully cope with eastern enlargement and accomplish several other impor-
tant projects. If necessary reforms or the EU constitutional treaty fail, or Turkey itself,
through problems arising in taking on EU regulations, sets other priorities, then a strategic
partnership is a sensible alternative. This could be developed as a long-term concept - an
‘Extended Associate Membership’ - for select strategic partners of the EU. The results in in-
dividual sections follow:
The EU in a critical phase of development
1. Eastern Enlargement is a capacity test for the EU: The planned commencement of acces-
sion negotiations with Turkey occurs at a critical time in the EU’s development. The en-
largement to include ten new members means a continuation of the necessary economic and
political deepening becomes an even more difficult task. In the area of economic integration,
the internal market and currency union demonstrate considerable progress. Both projects
must, however, be consolidated and completed. The Lisbon process, through which Europe
aspires to become the most innovative economy in the world, has not achieved the expected
results. Europe is insufficiently prepared to deal with the problems of enlargement and re-
form. The constitutional treaty is an important step towards strengthening the EU’s capacity
to act, but is not enough to cope with the internal and external tasks of a Union with at least
28 and perhaps 30 members. If the treaty fails and further economic and political reforms are
neglected, the threat of persisting integration crisis, and even a disintegration of the EU with
incalculable consequences for Europe’s political stability, will emerge. EU membership for
Turkey would then not be possible.
Turkey’s fulfilling of the political and economic criteria
2. There are doubts whether Turkey has fulfilled the political criteria: In its 2004 report the
Commission noted the considerable progress made by Turkey in the areas of democracy and
human rights. Nonetheless, there were considerable deficits in the practical implementation.
Accusations of systematic torture, not confirmed by Brussels but corroborated by other inde-
pendent sources, have caused deep concern in Europe. However, the Commission concludes
that Turkey fulfils the political criteria and that negotiations can begin. Based on the report it-
self (Commission 2004a)1 it could easily be interpreted that the criteria are not sufficiently
implemented in daily life. Rather, the momentum of reform and the hope for its continuation
has influenced a positive assessment. At present it is more likely than not that the European
Council will approve a commencement of negotiations, with some reservations and an em-
phasis on the durability of democratic reforms. Foreign and security policy considerations
may be the decisive factor. The negotiation process would then not be expedited but pro-
tracted. A conditional procedure could come into effect, with interruptions if violations of
                                                
1 Commission documents are listed in the bibliography under ‘European Commission’.
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human and democratic rights are observed. Designated acquis communautaire chapters, cer-
tain benchmarks or specific areas of the Copenhagen Criteria must also be practically imple-
mented before negotiations continue in connected areas. This could cause tensions with Tur-
key if the impression is of a deliberate delaying strategy.
3. Turkey is carrying out credible economic reforms that also have far-reaching political im-
plications. It is to Turkey’s advantage that, in contrast to the new EU members from CEE, it
does not have to change its complete economic system. Rather, the basic structures of a mar-
ket economy are secured. However, the functionality of the market is disturbed by high state
influence and recurring internal and external disequilibria (high debt and inflation). Periodic
crises and lapses in growth (recently 1999 and 2001) with extensive economic and social
costs resulted. Since 2001 successful stabilisation measures have been pursued. For the first
time these have seriously tackled the structural causes of fiscal deficits (banking system, state
enterprises, public sector, social system, agricultural subsidies) and thereby laid the founda-
tions for sustainable growth. The reforms have far-reaching socio-political consequences as
they affect the traditional political system of populism and/or clientelism.
4. Accession suitability in the economic area will be measured by Turkey’s capacity for sus-
tainable above average growth: The initial results of the Turkish economic reforms are posi-
tive. After the deep crisis of 2001 the economy has returned to a growth path (2003: almost
6%; prognosis 2004 and 2005: 5%), inflation has reduced (prognosis 2004: 12%; prognosis
2005: 8%), the currency has stabilised and debt indicators improved. It cannot yet be estab-
lished whether this is the beginning of a sustainable higher medium and long-term growth
path. It can, however, be affirmed that the reform road is long. While Turkey has made great
progress in reforming the banking system, privatisation and reform of the public sector and
the social system remain in the introductory phase. Adaptation pressure is high and during the
accession process Turkey will have to struggle with substantial economic and social problems
(regional disparities, poverty, education deficits, internal migration, infrastructure deficien-
cies). Of particular concern is the, in comparison with countries of a similar level of develop-
ment, unfavourable education indicators, along with high youth unemployment.
5. Fulfilment of the economic criteria will require many years: Regarding the economic crite-
ria, Turkey is in many areas only slightly worse than Bulgaria and Romania. If the reform
process is consistently pursued, within ten years there will be no serious barriers to a EU-
entry. This presumes that no further macro-economic crises obliterate the recovery process.
We do not share over-optimistic growth forecasts because of the great uncertainty on major
policy related growth factors. We assume a growth difference of 3 percentage points in per
capita GDP in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) between Turkey and the EU-15, which is
higher than that of the ten New Member Countries (NMCs). Even with such a positive eco-
nomic development an enormous gap between Turkey and the current EU will remain. A spe-
cial problem for Turkey is its huge regional disparities. The eastern part of the country can be
compared with a ‘developing country.’ These economic considerations will have substantial
effects on the content of negotiations (demands for transition periods), the timing (delaying
tactics) and the modalities (special rules for integration in community policies).
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6. Relevant indicators suggest it would be easier for the EU to integrate Mexico than Turkey;
Bulgaria and Romania are a false benchmark of preparedness to join the EU: Turkey is com-
parable in population size with the ten NMCs combined but produces roughly half of their
GDP. In many respects Turkey is not so different to Bulgaria and Romania, especially in its
major economic regions. However, lower education standards are reflected in the rating of the
Human Development Index (HDI) wherein, at position 88, Turkey is similar to Turkmenistan
and Paraguay. Concurrently the World Economic Forum (WEF) rated Turkey similar to Bul-
garia and Romania and in some areas better. This evaluation does not say anything about the
tremendous challenges EU membership poses for all these countries. An international com-
parison might illustrate the uniqueness of this venture: in most relevant indicators (including
income differentials) Mexico is doing much better than Turkey. Yet nobody is seriously con-
sidering a full integration (especially labour markets) of Mexico with the United States. The
similar rating of Bulgaria and Romania compared to Turkey does not imply that Ankara will
be ready to join the Union soon. Many acquis-related institutional and policy changes are
needed which are not reflected in the HDI and the World Competitiveness Index. The critical
question here is whether Bulgaria and Romania actually represent a sensible benchmark for
EU-membership? If they are considered to be a benchmark then we are observing an erosion
of EU standards caused by the enlargements. This might negatively affect the proper func-
tioning of the internal market and many other aspects of European integration. Additionally,
the EU is not properly prepared to deal with the economic and social implications of inte-
grating lower-middle-income countries.
Benefits and costs of EU accession for Turkey
7. Is EU membership a rational decision for Turkey? From the perspective of an acceding
country it is politically rational to seek to influence decisions of the ‘club’ by which those ac-
ceding will in any case be affected. This is an important motivation for EU membership,
which can also pay off economically. Despite its comparatively low economic power, Turkey
will become one of the more influential and militarily significant EU countries. Internally,
various political streams (AKP, opposition parties, economic elites, Kurds, even less moder-
ate Muslims) use the EU as an ‘external anchor’ to enforce their own, often very different po-
litical goals. In this sense political rationality endorses and explains deployment of the EU-
steered modernisation process in order to extend one’s own power position. It cannot be ex-
cluded, however, that some more radical Islamic or nationalist factions will regard the EU ac-
cession process as too restrictive. In such a situation Turkey’s political priorities may change
again and a looser connection to the EU would apply. It can be added that along with rational
motivations for membership, emotional considerations are also playing a role.
8. Turkey would benefit economically but extensive structural change may cause serious
problems: For Turkey, economically rational grounds for accession are the possible growth
and welfare effects, along with financial transfers, that would result from EU membership. As
trade barriers are in large part already removed by means of the Customs Union, the economic
effects will be limited (not more than 5% of GDP over a long run). These could be more ro-
bust (perhaps around 10%) if dynamic effects, in particular investment from external sources,
occur. A EU perspective, however defined, would encourage the increased political stability
that would promote this kind of development. The reform capacity and solidity of Turkish
EU Member Turkey?
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economic policy will nonetheless be decisive. Even with growth rates (5%) well over that of
the EU, Turkey will need about four decades to reach 75% of EU-15 income levels. Turkey
will certainly profit from EU transfer payments, which, according to current rules, will count
for 3% to 4% of GDP.
9. Implementation of the acquis will be a major problem for Turkey and entail costs that are
intensified by the demands of structural adjustment: Costs arise through structural change
(such as higher unemployment, especially in rural areas) and the acceptance of norms and
standards. These will burden Turkish small enterprises oriented to production for the local
market. Then come social and environmental standards, conceived for highly developed
countries, which could adversely affect the internationally competitive position of transition
countries. On the other hand there are in the medium and long-term also positive social out-
comes. Long transition periods are envisaged before the full introduction of EU environ-
mental standards in areas that do not directly concern the internal market. Difficult adaptation
is also certain for competition policy. Entry to the CAP will mean advantages for Turkish
consumers but disadvantages for farmers. Transfer payments from Brussels can mollify this
but the costs of structural change will be only partly compensated by EU structural and re-
gional policies. They will become fully available only after the initial and most difficult ad-
justment phase of ten to fifteen years. Higher levels of pre-accession financial assistance will
be necessary.
Costs and benefits of Turkish accession for the EU
10. The Commission’s Impact Study is too general to be a solid basis to evaluate the effects
on the Union: The Impact Study or ‘Issues Paper’ (Commission 2004b) released concurrent to
the Commission’s Regular Report assessed Turkey’s accession to the EU as incomparable,
though in geo-strategic and security policy terms as advantageous. It is envisaged that Turkey
could take on a stabilising function for the entire region, even if the formulation of a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) may concurrently run into difficulties. Additionally, po-
tential problems related to the control of the EU’s possible new and dangerous external bor-
ders are highlighted (organised crime, smuggling and terrorism). The economic effects on the
EU are assessed as rather insignificant and some adjustment pressure is expected (migration
between 0.4 to 4 million persons). The economic effects for Turkey are evaluated as positive.
In contrast to previous announcements, including from the Enlargement Commissioner, the
Commission also undertook an initial estimation of budgetary effects (two scenarios of net
costs in 2025: 		
		


	
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document is very general (new voting weights in the Parliament and the Council). Effects on
the Commission are, in light of forthcoming reductions in its numbers, not to be expected.
The Commission notes that ‘If well managed, Turkey’s accession to the EU would offer im-
portant opportunities for both.’ (Commission 2004b: 3). Measured against this, the remark
that the process is uncertain in terms of outcomes and will last many years (10 to 15), along
with proposals for restrictive negotiation procedures, indicate that in the Commission itself
doubts and ‘mixed feelings’ existed.
11. The growth impulse for the EU as a result of Turkey’s membership will be marginal:
From the Union’s viewpoint, the entry of a country is rational if it raises internal and external
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security and/or increases overall economic benefit. Considering the relatively small size of
Turkey‘s economy and the limited trade volume, membership for Turkey will have only mar-
ginal effects on growth in the current EU. This does not mean that trade and investment can-
not rapidly expand to bilateral advantage as a Turkish growth process occurs. Such a devel-
opment is also possible in the context of current integration levels combined with a solid na-
tional economic policy. A EU accession perspective further supports this. However, for the
continuation of Turkish economic reforms the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently
the more important and appropriate competent partner. This might change as the IMF has a
clear ‘exit strategy’.
12. The migration potential and the financial costs will be high: Potential economic effects
only have real purchase when unified rules are implemented in the same manner for all par-
ticipants of a defined economic group. In the case of Turkey this will require time and consid-
erable effort. Large economic disparities can also lead to adaptation costs in EU core coun-
tries. The income gap would remain an important motivation for itinerancy and a high – if
also difficult to quantify – migration potential is to be reckoned with (up to 4 million). Long-
term transition periods before full free movement of persons (together with a permanent safe-
guard clause) is introduced would then be unavoidable. The costs of an accession to the EU
by Turkey will be high: with full political integration, around  		
   
2014). By comparison the Commission estimates 		
 !		


	
and new member countries is to be expected if transfers to Turkey are redirected from else-
where or tax increases are imposed. It is unlikely that EU member states would be willing to
pay such large sums. Alternatives could be found by formulating special conditions for Tur-
key, which could stimulate political tensions with Ankara. Extensive reforms of agricultural
and structural politics would be the other option. However, they are very difficult to imple-
ment in a EU with 27 or more members.
13. Political-strategic arguments dominate: There are frequent assertions that accession ne-
gotiations will have resulting positive effects on European security, on the Turkish reform
process, and on the Islamic world (as a counter model to fundamentalist Islam). A perspective
of EU membership certainly supports the internal reform process. It would however be a bold
thesis that argued that the success or failure of the latter is dependent on the former. Such an
argument would be further weakened by the actual continuation of reforms independently of
the EU decision, because, as Turkish sources increasingly emphasise, they are in Turkey’s
interest. Its questionable status in the Arab Middle East, and tense relations with many of its
neighbours, means that any notion of Turkey’s functioning as some kind of model for other
Islamic states to emulate is presently hard to support (intellectually if not politically). Beyond
this, a European perspective for Turkey could also be developed without a necessary full EU
membership.
14. Membership for Turkey will have far-reaching consequences for the EU: The entry of the
CEECs has already changed the EU from a union of mainly rich industrial countries to a het-
erogeneous club with a large number of transition countries. Economic (in particular compe-
tition policy) and monetary policies are therefore faced with stern challenges to maintain in-
ternal coherence and a sharp focus on goals. This affects the enforcement of internal market
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regulations and coordination tasks. While the industrial core countries are compelled to inter-
nationally secure and extend their competitiveness in advanced technologies (see Lisbon
Agenda), the cohesion countries must first induce a successful real convergence process. Ad-
ditionally, the question is raised as to whether in such a heterogeneous economic space it is
sensible that all adhere to a communal monetary policy. Movement towards monetary union
should proceed cautiously and joining the Euro should remain optional.
15. The issue of cultural difference should not in principle exclude an accession, though it
should be dependent upon the agreement of the European citizenry: EU membership for Tur-
key has a political-cultural dimension that is of wide-ranging importance for both parties. It
cannot be determined a priori whether, against the background of a largely Islamic society
and a state whose secular character is guaranteed by the military, European values can be an-
chored and sustained in Turkey. If they can be, then this would certainly have an important
exemplar function. If this does not happen then a culturally motivated backlash would cause
enormous problems for the EU. It would require the application of comprehensive sanction
mechanisms in order to enforce basic values. For the EU, as a union of citizens, the member-
ship of Turkey is also a matter of identity. European citizens should answer the question of
whether the cultural and/or geographic borders of Europe have been transcended. An entry for
Turkey would be justified if they gave a clear vote in favour. They would then also be pre-
pared to render the necessary solidarity within the community framework.
The EU’s negotiation concept and alternative integration concepts
16. The negotiation process will be (intentionally) protracted and Ankara may be faced with a
membership second-class: The uncertainties of a future accession process influenced the
Commission’s proposal for a conditional (significantly restricted) negotiation procedure with
Turkey. The actual implementation of individual acquis areas will be a prerequisite for the
continuation of negotiations in other linked areas. For the EU, such a strategy is a form of
self-protection. Thereby the process will be drawn out over ten to fifteen years. This strategy
is not without risks as it could cause frustration and lead to political conflict with Turkey. On
the other hand, the time gained would give Turkey and the EU room for manoeuvre in order
to enforce necessary reforms. High migration potential means that full free access for persons
will in any case be excluded for many years. Moreover, the EU would seek to avoid fully ex-
tending its expenditure program to Turkey. Ankara is threatened with a membership second-
class.
17. Europe’s functioning as a ‘stability anchor’ for Turkey does not necessitate its full EU
membership; this could also be organised by means of a ‘Privileged Partnership’ or an Ex-
tended Associate Membership: Turkey receives strong backing from international organisa-
tions (IMF, World Bank, OECD), which already act as ‘external anchors’ balancing the inter-
nal reform process. However, it is questionable whether the EU could credibly sustain an
‘external anchor’ function over 15 or perhaps more years, the time-span envisaged for Tur-
key’s accession. Integration alternatives are, in light of obligations entered into and foreign
policy considerations, presently not likely to be officially offered or accepted. Nonetheless
factors internal to the EU (refusal of a Turkish entry by a member state government or elec-
torate, or incapacity for reform), or through uncertainties on the Turkish side (possible retro-
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gression in the reform process), could motivate reappraisals. It is therefore sensible to con-
sider more precisely formulated ideas for alternatives. This study’s Extended Associate Mem-
bership (EAM) concept goes beyond that of a Privileged Partnership. The EAM presents a du-
rable and clearly defined perspective for Turkey and other EU aspirants, which, in addition to
economic integration (European Economic Area - EEA), also envisages forms of political in-
tegration (participation in European Council meetings) and a more substantive financial bene-
fit through customised inclusion in various EU programs.
18. If the negotiations are commenced, they may well culminate with a ‘Privileged Partner-
ship’: Should a negotiation process begin it will be faced with many uncertainties. If the con-
stitutional treaty fails this will in practice signal a preliminary end for Turkey’s perspective of
full membership. The same would be likely if reforms in Turkey stagnate. The Commission
has indicated that were this to eventuate negotiations could immediately be suspended. They
may be precluded in the course of the ratification process or through a referendum in one or
more member states. The Commission appears aware of these potential outcomes and empha-
sises that ‘regardless of the outcome of the negotiations or the subsequent ratification process,
the relations between EU and Turkey must ensure that Turkey remains fully anchored in
European structures.’ (Commission 2004c: 3)  Consequently, despite the insistence of some
member state governments that Turkey is ready for full membership, and Turkey’s frequent
declarations that it will accept nothing less, the relationship could ultimately be configured in
the form of a ‘Privileged Partnership’ or ‘Extended Associate Membership’. The possibility
of unrealistic expectations and related disappointment should be avoided by establishing at
the outset that the negotiation process, if it begins, is open-ended.
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1. Introduction: The Debate on Turkey’s EU Membership Intensifies
The endorsement or refusal of EU membership for Turkey is a strategic decision. Both Tur-
key and the EU are at a critical junction. The conditionally positive view of the Commission
in its latest progress report (Commission 2004a) and the apparently supportive position of
most member states do not conceal the reality that Europe is deeply divided. This applies to
several governments, much of the Brussels civil service apparatus, and, before all, the EU’s
national publics. Differing opinions also circulate within virtually all political parties. This
ambivalence reflects great uncertainty about the future of Europe, the EU’s tasks, and its abil-
ity to manage the challenges placed before it. Concurrently Turkey has made great efforts to
meet the preconditions demanded of it and appears determined to join the EU. This study
analyses the readiness of Turkey for EU entry and the potential consequences of this for the
EU. It also introduces the concept of an ‘Extended Associate Membership’ (EAM) as an inte-
gration alternative that would go beyond a ‘Privileged Partnership’. EAM could operate as a
temporary or permanent integration model that might also serve for other strategic partners of
the EU.
2. Ever ‘closer’ or ever ‘wider’ Europe?
European unification is a project of near permanent crisis. It has no obvious exit or end sta-
tion. The phrase ‘ever closer union’ (Dinan 1999; Streit and Voigt 1996) currently echoes as it
did at previous crossroads in European integration: those, for example, represented by Ger-
man reunification, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), or eastern enlargement. The idea
behind the phrase has always been disputed. While for decades a deepening of the EU was, at
least verbally, in the foreground, in recent years the practical political direction has been that
of widening. What likelihood now exists for the realisation of an ever more densely integrated
union of states? (Cameron 2004a)
Widening is considered as a major strategic endeavour: that of securing peace and order in
Europe. Assisted by the presence of NATO this has been successful in the past. Southern and
eastern enlargements have contributed to an institutional uniting of the continent. Excepting
the Balkan crisis, Europe has enjoyed almost 60 years of peace. But can this strategy be suc-
cessful indefinitely? If it is further pursued the EU should, as a consequence, prove itself as a
solid partner of the USA in fighting terrorism, solving regional conflicts, deploying force
projection where necessary, and generally stabilising its neighbourhood. There are doubts
about the extent to which the EU can do this effectively. However, the preconditions for
Europe as a global actor are often misunderstood. If the EU is reduced to being a free trade
area with a loose political coordination it will be a weak international partner. It must accom-
plish some serious deepening in order to discharge its European and international tasks (Cf.
Cameron 2004b). On to this already congested and demanding agenda comes Turkey. The
question of its membership is now embedded in the discursive context of multiple integration
concepts and problems.
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2.1. Challenges of Economic Integration: Important Integration Projects Must
be Advanced
Turkey’s inclusion into the EU would present a serious challenge to Europe’s integrative ca-
pacities in the economic domain. Comparatively weak economic development in recent years
impresses that the project of economic integration urgently requires new dynamism. The in-
ternal market is incomplete and must be supplemented by further liberalisation measures (be-
fore all in the services and financial sectors) in order to generate expected levels of growth.
After repeated damaging of the ‘Stability Pact’ by its most important founding members, the
currency union finds itself in a credibility crisis. The results of the Lisbon Process, which had
the declared goal to develop the EU into ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world’, have proved disappointing (Quaisser and Wegner 2004).
Eastern enlargement offers countless opportunities for the integration process and is con-
temporaneously full of risks. The enlarged internal market can generate increased prosperity.
If its rules are not adequately implemented conflicts can be reckoned with. An excessively
rapid entry of new members into EMU may well overextend their capacities for adaptation.
This is especially so when European monetary policy pays only limited attention to the now
multiplied and amplified economic differences. High unemployment and social tensions
would likely result. The Lisbon process promoted the enlargement by means of an intensified
division of labour. If technology transfer is too slow or is restricted to too few segments of the
national economies, then economic convergence will stagnate. The EU is in a critical phase
when important economic projects must be consolidated – or, better, pro-actively driven for-
ward – and simultaneously the current and future enlargements must be successfully con-
cluded.
Table 1: Economic Challenges of Deepening and Widening
Issue Problems Deepening Problems Widening
Internal Market Certain projects still unfinished: services,
financial markets, energy markets
Institutional deficits may undermine the
acquis
Monetary Union Damaging of the stability pact as a reaction
to budget deficits and unemployment in
large member states; variable inflation rates
Wide variation in inflation rates impose great
challenges for European monetary policy
(= differences in real convergence)
Lisbon Process Progress is limited because policy coordina-
tion (‘open method’) remains weak.
Lack of infrastructure; technical and mana-
gerial capacity; and low technology level
limit competitiveness
2.2. Political Implications and Challenges: Europe as Political Construction Site
Many of Europe’s economic problems result from deficits of the political process. Further lib-
eralisation of the internal market is blocked with reference to purported ‘national interests’. It
is inadequately grasped that EMU goes far beyond shifting some sovereign rights to the Euro-
pean level and that persistent impairment of the ‘Stability Pact’ will seriously damage its
credibility. The Lisbon process demonstrates that the open method of coordination does not
(or is not able to) create sufficient political incentives to implement ‘best practice’ solutions
following a benchmarking approach. Economic policies are still dependent on the internal
political constellations of individual member states. Coordination is far from reaching maxi-
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mum efficiency. Enlargements will exacerbate problems already apparent with 15 members.
Eastern enlargement has substantially intensified the differentiation process within the EU.
The political implications of increasing size and heterogeneity are extensive. In the agri-
cultural and structural policy areas, distribution conflicts rage and available financial re-
sources shrink. Economic policy harmonisation is harder. By necessity the new system com-
petition (Sinn 2003) will gain in importance as a shaping principle, even if simplified rules
and a minimum level of harmonisation must accompany it. This means that political integra-
tion will become more difficult.
Low levels of participation in the European elections are an indicator of Euro-
scepticism among wide sections of the populations.
Meanwhile the vision of a United Europe is losing its attraction. The 2004 elections to the
European Parliament (EP) provided the latest in a series of steadily reducing turnouts: now
down to around 45% of eligible voters. In some countries (Poland, United Kingdom, Sweden)
Euro-sceptic parties have gained in influence. This may be partially explained by complex
and non-transparent decision-making processes. Other reasons may be found in the increasing
heterogeneity of the EU and in different concepts of integration resulting from various en-
largements. The UK, the CEECs and the Scandinavian countries (with the exception of Fin-
land) remain averse to rescinding sovereignty, although they are hardly the only examples.
The EU has to overcome some legacies that pose serious threats to its development. There
have been several attempts at streamlining institutions and policies to make them fit for en-
largement and global competition. For the most part they failed (Berlin summit 1999/Agenda
2000; Amsterdam IGC 1997; Nice IGC 2000) or produced only small improvements. A re-
newed effort to clarify decision-making powers was made through a European Convention,
consisting of representatives of national parliaments, the EP, and the European Commission.
It had the task to formulate a European Constitution. A draft was rejected in Rome in Decem-
ber 2003 but another was finally accepted at the end of the Irish presidency in June 2004. In
October it was signed in Rome.
The new constitution is a half-step to more efficient EU institutions and decision-
making mechanisms.
The new constitution (approved on 18 June 2004 by the Intergovernmental Conference, has to
be confirmed by national Parliaments or in referendum) denotes progress but is far from suffi-
cient. With its 465 articles, five protocols and three declarations the draft is hardly a constitu-
tion as previously understood. It is not easily understandable but does make some improve-
ment by consolidating all previous treaties in one text. A number of reforms have been pro-
posed which address the most important mistakes of the Nice Treaty and should make the EU
institutions more efficient and democratically legitimated. Besides the charter of human
rights, the power of the EP has increased, and qualified majority voting (QMV) has been ex-
tended in the Council. If the constitution is ratified a double majority of 55% of member
states that also represent at least 65% of the total EU population will be required to pass a
vote. In addition the Commission will be streamlined in 2014, After then two-thirds of the
member states, rather than all of them, will send commissioners to Brussels. Tensions may
occur as the rotation principle could result in larger states (which provide a major part of the
EU’s economic power) occasionally not having one of their nationals as a commissioner.
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Other new proposals like a two and a half-year presidency of the European Council and a EU
foreign minister have to prove beneficial in practice.
Although EU competences (decision-making power) and the principle of subsidiarity re-
ceived some attention, overall efficiency and the institutional balance between the Council,
the Parliament and the Commission remain precarious. The document is overloaded (too
many issues are raised in detail) yet leaves some important questions untouched. Clarifying
competences in economic issues and policy reforms have not been the mandate of the Con-
vention but remain crucial for the future. Hence the draft takes only a half-step towards a
more efficient EU. It must nonetheless be interpreted as reflecting the maximum achievable at
the time. The most apparent deficit is that there are no major advances towards political union
and the question of the EU’s finalité remains open. Moreover, it is far from certain that the
constitution will be ratified by all national parliaments or accepted in all national referendums
(Quaisser and Wegner 2004). Potential membership for Turkey must be considered against
this background.
Table 2: Political Challenges of Deepening and Widening
Political Issue Problems Deepening Problems Widening
CFSP Different global interests; variable relation-
ships with the USA; ‘sovereignty’ and QMV
Additional ‘special interests’ complicate po-
litical coordination
Defence Interoperability; financial resources; tech-
nological capacity; duplication of NATO
(conflicts); pacifism in electorates
Greater variation in preferences and ‘vi-
sions’; extension of technology and other
resources
Voting Competitive coalition building; blocking mi-
norities
Multiplication of competitive coalition per-
mutations
Constitution Leaves finalité politique open; changes of
government in member states may lead to
ratification problems
Reaching agreement on the EU’s objectives
is complicated; resistance against the con-
stitution in some new member states
Budget/Transfers Intensified conflicts between net receivers
and net payers
Multiplication of distribution conflicts
3. The Commencement of EU-Entry Negotiations with Turkey is a
Political Decision
From the beginning the perspective of EU (initially European Economic Community, later
European Community) membership for Turkey was a strategic-political decision. During the
Cold War the country constituted NATO’s decisive southern flank. While the 1963 Associa-
tion Agreement was intended to link Turkey economically and politically with Europe, the
commencement of concrete entry negotiations was continually delayed. Through the invasion
of Cyprus and the island’s division in 1974, and the military Putsch of September 1980, Ankara
squandered its options. Thereafter came various conflicts with Greece, which brought the two
states to the brink of war (including disputes over tiny islands). This could only be brought un-
der control through international intervention, ultimately with the assistance of the USA.
After the end of the Cold War Turkey remained an important partner of the West, princi-
pally because of the threats posed by radical Islam and related terrorism and instability in the
Middle East. In December 1999 the EU concluded that Turkey would be assessed as an entry-
willing country by the same criteria as other candidates. At the EU summit in Copenhagen in
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December 2002 it was declared that ‘in December 2004 the European Council would, on the
basis of a report and recommendation of the Commission, determine if Turkey fulfils the po-
litical Copenhagen (1993) criteria’. The decisive prerequisites for the commencement of entry
negotiations, which could begin at the earliest from May 2005, would thereby be met.
The political Copenhagen Criteria are, in terms of practical implementation, still not
fulfilled
Fulfilment of the political Copenhagen Criteria requires that a state has democratic institu-
tions and procedures and that EU human rights standards are implemented and assured. In the
past three years Turkey has achieved a notable level of legislative (two major constitutional
reforms, eight legislative packages) and practical progress. The influence of the military has
reduced: in August 2004 the first civilian was appointed as head of the powerful military
council; there is better control of off-budget funds. The death penalty has been abolished,
torture forbidden (zero tolerance policy), laws on the forming of associations and the right to
assemble have been liberalised, and religious and ethnic minorities have acquired greater legal
rights. After further controversies with the EU over the criminal status of adultery a new penal
code was passed almost in the last minutes before the release of Commission’s report. These
legal reforms mean that relics from the ‘oriental middle ages’ (‘honour killings’) as well as
torture and marital rape will now be punished with increased severity (Handelsblatt 27 Sep-
tember 2004).
In its statement from October 2004 the Commission declares: ‘that Turkey sufficiently ful-
fils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiation be opened.’ (Commission
2004c: 3). It is questionable, however, whether these reforms represent a complete break-
through as they have not yet been systematically implemented. This requires, as a precondi-
tion, a transformation of attitudes and behaviour at all levels of the state apparatus (Gürbey
2004). The Commission (2004c: 3) impresses that ‘The irreversibility of the reform process,
its implementation, in particular with regards to fundamental freedoms will need to be con-
firmed over a longer period of time’.
The confirmation in May 2004 of earlier judgements against Kurdish Members of Parlia-
ment, in particular the case of Leyla Zana, indicated the persistence of stubborn resistance. In
July the verdict was dismissed and the disputed courts (State Security Council) dissolved.
This was a response to external pressure. Nonetheless, shortcomings in the legal area remain.
This is reflected by Turkey not being considered by Germany as a ‘safe third state’ (sicherer
Drittstaat) for purposes of evaluating asylum appeals. Turkey is the originating country of
most asylum candidates (80% Kurds). In 2003 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
laid 76 charges of human rights violations against Turkey (Die Welt 26 October 2004). In the
complex context of an Islam-influenced society and a state whose secular character is de facto
secured by the military, the full implementation of democratic rights and freedoms in every-
day life will be a long process.1
                                                
1 An indication of the contemporary and forthcoming difficulties was the Erdogan government’s attempt to im-
plement a law on higher education institutions. It resulted in graduates from religious schools, for whom it had
been foreseen that they would solely undertake studies oriented to becoming Imams, acquiring access to univer-
sities without additional examinations (Handelsblatt 13 May 2004). This was later vetoed by the President.
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Four ‘harmonization’ reform packages became law progressively through 2003. They in-
cluded measures to eliminate ‘regulations and practices that had contributed to impunity for
torture and ill-treatment’ and ‘the possibility of retrial for those whom the European Court of
Human Rights ruled had suffered a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights as
a result of a court ruling in Turkey’. Despite these promising developments there are recurring
allegations of torture. It has not been confirmed that the state has systematically undertaken
such activity. Yet many sources, including an April 2004 report by the Turkish Human Rights
Foundation note a multiplicity of violations including torture and other contraventions of
democratic rights and freedoms (Human Rights Foundation 2004; Amnesty International
2004a; 2004b; 2004c; Middel 2004; Süddeutsche Zeitung 11-12 September 2004).
Table 3: The Political Copenhagen Criteria and their Evaluation by the Commission
Criterion Evaluation of the Commission
1) Democracy and rule of law
a) Parliament Free elections; since 1999 absolute majority of the moderate Islamic party AKP;
strong consensus between government and opposition on EU membership; many
laws adapted to comply with the EU; parliament represents 55% of voters (following
outcome of 2002 elections); 10% electoral threshold.
b) Executive One-Party government, greater political stability; European Union Secretary General
(EUSG) plays an important role for EU adjustment, some concern whether EUSG ca-
pacities are sufficient; President of the Republic used veto eights times (blocked re-
form of public administration and education, which would have favoured the Islamic
movement).
c) National Security Council (NSC) Civilian control of military strengthened; NSC transformed into advisory council;
August 2004 first civilian heads NSC, control of extra-budget funds.
d) The judicial system State Security Council has been abolished and replaced by Heavy Penal Courts; con-
stitutional amendments in May 2004 enshrine the principle of international and EU
treaties over national legislation. New Penal Code, in line with European standards,
adopted in September 2004
e) Anti-Corruption measures Disagreement in this area played a big role in the financial crisis February 2001, since
Turkey has ratified major international and European conventions; progress has been
made in anti-corruption measures but corruption remains a very serious problem.
2) Human rights and protection of
minorities
General evaluation: International conventions have been ratified; increased effort to
comply with the European Court of Human Rights.
a) Civil and political rights Death penalty abolished; further efforts to strengthen the fight against torture (zero
tolerance policy); systemic torture not confirmed but numerous cases of ill-treatment
including torture; prison system improves but still deficits; progress in press freedoms
but more effort needed to address outstanding issues (such as frequent prosecutions
against journalists); in the field of broadcasting significant progress for languages
other than Turkish, in practice considerable restrictions still exist; freedom of religion
guaranteed in the Constitution but restrictions remain (property rights).
b) Economic and Social freedoms If adopted, a new Law on Associations would reduce state interference and contribute
to strengthening of civil society; significant constraints on the right to organise and the
right to collective bargaining; gender equality. strengthened but substantial efforts
needed to ensure that women take an equal place in the society; violence against
women, including ‘honour killings’, remain a major problem
c) Cultural rights; protection of mi-
norities
The ban on the use of Kurdish language was lifted, with some delay broadcasting and
teaching in Kurdish was allowed; still considerable restriction on the exercise of cul-
tural rights
3) Political dialogue (foreign pol-
icy)
Political dialogue with Greece developed positively; Turkey supported the UN plan on
Cyprus
Source: Commission 2004a and own evaluation
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A recent study of Turkey’s suitability notes a ‘big fall in the severest forms of torture (to
around 20 cases)’ (Hughes 2004: 3). The Commission report emphasises the zero-tolerance
policy towards torture and that a number of perpetrators have been punished but also states
that ‘numerous cases of ill-treatment including torture still continue to occur and further ef-
forts will be required to eradicate such practices’ (Commission 2004a: 17, 35, 54, 165).2 Proof
that this particularly serious transgression is continuing would be enough to exclude Turkey
from EU membership. During his visit to Turkey in September 2004, Verheugen was con-
fronted with claims of systematic torture still occurring in the country. ‘If that is true, we
don’t need to talk about the other EU criteria any more’ said the Commissioner (Wernicke
2004).
In its October 2004 report the Commission emphasises Turkey’s considerable political and
economic progress, though the overall balance is mixed. The extensive and well elaborated
sections (over 40 pages) on the political criteria impress that significant progress is visible but
problems remain in many areas: freedom of expression (many cases of non-violent opinion
prosecuted, disproportional force used against demonstrators), freedom of religious belief (re-
stricted property rights for non-Muslims, ‘interference’ in their activities), discrimination and
violence against women, including ‘honour killings’. The situation of minorities improved
and the ban of Kurdish and other languages has been lifted, but considerable restrictions still
exist. On the basis of this report it could easily be argued that the political criteria are not ful-
filled. The ‘momentum of reforms’ may well have influenced the on-balance positive judge-
ment.
Despite the insufficient realisation of European basic rights principles, a ‘political assess-
ment’ of the Commission’s evaluation by the EU heads of state and government in December
2004 could lead to the EU commencing negotiations - with provisions and a strong insistence
on the durability of democratic reforms. The determination of Recep Erdogan’s government,
along with its constructive role in the search for a solution to the Cyprus question and im-
proved relations with neighbouring states, especially Greece, will be extolled, as it was by the
Commission.
Table 4: Comparative Evaluation of Political Rights and Civil Freedoms 2003/2004
Political Rights Civil Freedoms Together Trend Classification
EU-15 1.0 1.0 1.0 Positive Free
CEE Round 1 1.0 1.8 1.4 Stable Free
CEE Round 2 1.5 2.0 1.8 Positive Free
Turkey 3.0 4.0 3.5 Positive Partly Free
Ukraine 4.0 4.0 4.0 Stable Partly Free
Note: Ratings are determined on a scale whereby 1 represents the best and 7 the worst evaluation Countries ranking from 1 to
3 are classified as ‘free’, from 3 to 5.5 as ‘partly free’ and over 5.5 as ‘not free’; Ratings reflect global events from 1 January
2003 to 30 November 2003. Source: Freedom House (2003/2004)
Nevertheless, such a decision by the Council would be highly sensitive, as it would not
correspond to the usual practice: realisation of the political criteria as a precondition for ne-
gotiations. Some EU states are rather hesitant and the position of the new members, who will
                                                
2 Precisely the same sentence appears on all four cited pages.
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now also decide on an enlargement, is still open. In the Freedom House organisation’s
2003/2004 evaluations of political rights and civil freedoms Turkey is considered a ‘partly
free country’, with a distinctly worse grading than the new EU members, as well as Bulgaria
and Romania (Table 4). Taking the strivings of Turkish officialdom into account, the next
evaluation should indicate a much improved outcome for Turkey, though a considerable gap
with the current EU will remain.
Political and institutional deficiencies are obstacles to fulfilment of economic criteria
Political deficiencies might also affect Turkey’s ability to fulfil the economic criteria and
achieve the performance hoped for or expected of it. Corruption remains widespread, more
extensive than in Bulgaria though less than in Romania (Transparency International; Cf. The-
isen 2004). Reforms to legal systems are progressing slowly and inefficient administrative
structures are undermining entrepreneurship as well as the implementation of major EU poli-
cies and laws. These shortcomings are evident in several indices of the World Economic Fo-
rum.
Table 5 shows that the average of CEEC-Round 1 is estimated at around 20 ranking posi-
tions worse than the EU-15. This reflects the enormous challenges faced by the more ad-
vanced CEECs to improve public institutions towards EU standards. Bulgaria and Romania
are ranked 24 positions behind CEEC Round-1. Turkey is ranked 11 positions better than the
latter countries, reaching a score similar to Russia (65). Summing up: the institutional adapta-
tion problems Turkey faces are enormous but not so different to those of Bulgaria and Roma-
nia.
Table 5: Selected Indices on Socio-Political Conditions for EU-Membership
Public Institution
Index (2004)
Contracts and Law
Sub-index (2003)
Corruption Sub-index
(2003)
Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score
EU-15 19 5.82 20 5.36 20 6.07
    Finland   3 6.48   1 6.35   4 6.68
    Greece 44 4.74 37 4.63 52 4.79
CEEC-Round 1 43 4.87 48 4.28 36 5.46
     Estonia 26 5.59 32 4.85 27 5.85
     Poland 80 3.70 66 3.59 53 4.75
CEEC-Round-2 65 4.15 87 2.84 62 4.54
     Bulgaria 56 4.36 92 2.72 35 5.50
     Romania 74 3.94 83 2.97 90 3.58
Turkey 62 4.22 52 4.03 69 4.12
Note: The evaluation comprises 102 countries, rated from 1 = best country, 102 = worst country. The indices are based on vari-
ous sub- and sub-sub indices, drawing on available hard data and data from the Executive Opinion Survey conducted annually
by the World Economic Forum. The survey covers 8700 responses from business leaders worldwide. The scores range from 1
(worst possible evaluation) to 7 (best possible evaluation). Source: World Economic Forum 2004, Authors Calculations
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4. Economic Backwardness and Convergence: Decades are Needed
Turkey’s economic problems are sometimes cited as grounds to oppose its EU membership.
The income difference between it and the EU-15 is indeed huge. In 2003 Turkey’s per capita
income level was 23% of the EU-15 (27.5% of EU-25) calculated at Purchasing Power (PPS)
and 12.3% at exchange rate values (13.8% EU-25). The Turkish agricultural sector employs
33% of the workforce compared with 5% in the EU-25 (4% EU-15; see table 6). However,
Turkey is characterised by huge regional disparities: 80% of its value added is produced in
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other large cities. The richest region reaches 46% of the EU-25
average (comparable to Slovakia) but the poorest only 8% (Commission 2004b).
Turkey’s indicators suggest that economic backwardness compared to the EU-15 is similar
to the second round of CEECs. The per capita GDP of Romania and Bulgaria reach only 10%
of EU-15 levels in current exchange rates and 30% in PPS. Structural indicators like the con-
tribution of agriculture to employment (Turkey 34%, Romania 34%, Bulgaria 27%) and to the
national economy (all around 11% to 13%) are also similar. Taking territory and population
into consideration, Turkey’s accession is comparable to that of the first CEEC accession
round, with only half of their combined GDP. What are striking are the huge differences in
living conditions indicated by the HDI. The average ranking position of the EU-25 is 25. The
NMCs reach an average ranking of 44, Bulgaria 56 and Romania 69. Turkey’s position is 88 –
similar to that of Paraguay and Jordan – and much worse that Russia (57) and the Ukraine
(70). The major reason for this ranking is the 20% lower score in the education index.
Table 6: Indicators of Socio-economic Development: CEECs and the EU-15 (20031)
Population
in millions
GDP per
capita in
euros
GDP per
capita in
PPS2
PPS as % of
EU-15
average8
Agriculture in
total
employment8
Agriculture as
% of GDP
HDI ranking3
EU-15 381 23858 24000 100 4.0 1.7 15
EU-25 453 21300 22300 93 5.0 2.1 25
NMCs-10 103 4700 9600 30 13.4 6.6 44
Bulgaria 7.8 2260 6280 26 27.7 11.4 56
Romania 21.7 2320 6300 23 34.1 12.9 69
Turkey 70.7 3000 6300 23 33.9 11.5 88
Mexico 102.0 55407 89707 (37)8 18.1 4 53
1 Human Development Index (HDI) for 2002; EU-15 for 1999. 2 PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) is calculated in current eu-
ros. 3 HDI ranking is based on a synthetic measure of eight socio-economic variables, a lower number indicating a better rank-
ing position. 4 Unweighted average. 5 Share in value added in 1998. 6 Average HDI-ranking position of EU-15; 7 in US $, 8 based
on a parity exchange rate between US$ and Euro.
Sources: European Commission (2003); Eurostat; Human Development Report, UNDP (2003).
Projections on the income gap between Turkey and the EU at the time of a speculated EU-
entry in 2013 suggest it is unlikely that the large difference will disappear. For our calcula-
tions we use commonly accepted technical assumptions on the rate of per capita GDP growth
of the EU (at 2% p.a.) and the countries entering the EU (first accession round at 4% p.a; sec-
ond accession round and Turkey at 5% p.a.). Nominal per capita GDP will stay at 15% of the
EU-15 level and per capita GDP in PPS at 32% of the EU-15 level (Table 7).
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Table 7: Basic Data of the Enlarged EU in 2013
Size in % of
EU-2013
Population in
Mill.
GDP in %
EU-20133
Per Capita-GDP in %
of EU-153
2001             2013
Per-Capita-GDP (PPS) in %
of EU-153
2001             2013
EU-20131 1002  560.72 100 - 74.2 - 81.4
EU-15 62.2 376.5 91.4 100 100 100 100
CEEC-Round-1 14.3 71.1 4.9 22.6 28.6 44.5 56.2
CEEC-Round-2 6.8 7.5 0.8 8.4 12.0 25.9 36.7
Turkey 15.2 79.0 2.8 10.3 14.5 22.2 31.5
1  EU-2013: EU-15, all CEECs and Turkey; 2  Including Malta, Cyprus and Croatia. 3 Assumed average yearly growth rate EU-15:
2%; CEEC-Round-1: 4%, CEEC-Round-2 and Turkey: 5%. Sources: European Commission; Statistisches Bundesamt (2002);
UN Population Forecast Middle-Scenario, Revision 2000; authors’ calculations.
No economic miracle can be expected, including in a long-term perspective. Figure 1
shows that since the 1960s Turkey’s income level has not drawn closer to the EU average.
While there have indeed been periods with above average growth, these were not sufficient to
compensate for intermittent economic crises and strong population increases. Adaptation pro-
cesses for prices and the exchange rate make PPS projections for the income level difficult.
Simple projections show that even if a convergence process with a GDP-growth difference of
3 percentage points were sustained, Turkey would need more than half a century to reach in-
come levels comparable with the EU-15. In 2025 Turkey would reach 47% of the EU-15’s per
capita GDP in PPS.
Other studies suggest a mixture of positive factors that could launch Turkey on a rapid and
sustained convergence path (Dervis, Gros, et al., 2004). These rather optimistic calculations
suggest that Turkey could reach a convergence rate of 4.5 percentage points and achieve over
60% of the EU-15’s real income level in the same time-span. The combination of demo-
graphic dynamism (population growth, young workforce), structural change (from agriculture
to industry), and a tight fiscal policy that attracts private investment, is assumed to promote
economic growth. It would also require efforts to improve physical and especially human
capital formation (at the moment a great deficit) and a substantial improvement in the institu-
tional environment. This should be accompanied by robust increases in FDI (up to 2% of
GDP), helping to promote technological change and to increase the investment rate in a sus-
tainable way (Dervis, Emerson, et al., 2004). A recent OECD study (2004: 25) foresees a
growth differential with the EU of nearly 4%. In 2015 Turkey would reach over 40% of the
EU-15’s per capita GDP measured in PPS.
Does this represent wishful thinking? At the moment the short-term economic performance
looks bright with high growth rates over 5% (see Table 11) and some essential economic and
institutional reforms underway (public and financial sector). At the same time a turnaround in
the investment ratio and FDI did not materialise. The OECD (2004: 8) states that it is too
early to determine whether the Turkish economy’s rebound after 2001 will be transformed
into consistent long-term growth. Turkey has to overcome three traps that have prevented this:
low confidence in political and macro-economic management, weak governance, and large
informality (shadow economy). A EU perspective might help a reform agenda but is no guar-
antee for success as the disappointing convergence process of some EU countries (Greece)
proves. The experience of the NMCs – with their definitive EU perspective – are also not en-
tirely a success story. This influences our more cautious attitude to the future Turkish growth
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path. A 3-percentage point growth differential in per capita GDP in PPS between Turkey and
the EU-15 (as we assume) would be a success story, especially considered against the back-
ground of existing deficits in the major growth factors.
Figure 1: Convergence of Per-Capita-GDP in PPS (EU=100)
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Note on sources: Up to 2005, data and projections: European Commission. 2005 to 2030, own projections based on the follow-
ing assumptions: Per capita GDP of the Accession Countries will grow by 2 percentage points (as in the past decade) and Tur-
key by 3 percentage points higher than the EU-15 average.
5. Economic Criteria will not Delay Negotiations but will Delay Turkey’s
EU-Entry
The economic criteria have to be based on available or estimated data, although the validity
and accuracy of this remains open to interpretation. Moreover, institutional changes are hardly
measurable in quantitative terms. In its evaluation for 2004, the Commission concluded that
Turkey had ‘made further considerable progress towards being a functioning market econ-
omy, in particular by reducing its macro-economic imbalances. Turkey should also be able to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, provided that it firmly
maintains its stabilisation policy and takes further decisive steps towards structural reforms’
(Commission 2004a: 70).
5.1. The Functioning of Turkey’s Distorted Market Economy is Improving
Turkey’s achievements related to the first economic criteria (‘functioning market economy’)
could be summarised as follows:
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Table 8: Criterion of ‘Functioning Market Economy’ and the Commission’s Evaluation
Sub-Criteria of Functioning Market Economy Evaluation of the Commission
1) Price- and foreign trade liberalisation Room for market forces increased; price instability re-
duced by decline in state subsidies; Price distortions
reduced by cutting the price support scheme in agri-
culture and introducing a direct support system
2) No notable restrictions for market entry or exit Barriers to market entry and exit have come down but
still impede domestic competition
3) Stable legal framework (especially property rights);
guaranteed enforcement of laws and treaties
Progress has been made in reducing state interference
in the economy and establishing the necessary legal
and institutional framework for a modern, rule based
economy; problems with the commercial judiciary
cause serious bottlenecks in implementing laws and
enforcing contracts.
4) Macro-economic stability, including appropriate
price stability, sustainable fiscal and foreign trade
balances
Monetary policy is strictly anti-inflation; floating ex-
change rate; 2002 curbing in finance policy eased, cor-
rection first in summer 2003; state debt quote sinks but
still a major burden for the economy; transparency of
public finances improves; inflation declines (single digit
in mid-2004); current account remains in save margin;
public sector reform helps to overcome institutional
deficits causing fiscal imbalances
5) broad consensus on the bases of economic policy The broad consensus about the essentials of eco-
nomic policy confirmed
6) privatisation of state enterprises Progress in privatisation limited; in manufacturing,
state owned enterprises still account for 20% of value
added and 12% of employment
7) developed financial sector that will stimulate pro-
ductive investment
Financial sector sounder but is still underdeveloped;
banking sector functioning effectively; restructuring and
consolidation not yet completed; improvements in
banking sector regulation and supervision
Source: Commission 2004a and authors’ evaluation
… The basic mechanism of a market economy is in place ....
In contrast to the CEECs, Turkey did not suffer from problems associated with the transition
from a planned to a market economy. The economy is based on free prices and realised a high
degree of foreign-trade liberalisation, especially toward the EU. Nevertheless, internally some
prices are still regulated (around 25% of the CPI basket) such as agriculture, energy and rent.
These need to be deregulated further. Cutting the price support scheme in agriculture and in-
troducing a direct support system led to a decline in price distortions over recent years.
From a legal standpoint market entry and exit are already secured but in the real world
several obstacles remain. The large number of market entries and exits indicate a liberal re-
gime but bureaucracy means legislative processes are slow. A high density of rules and direc-
tives for business and slow reform in regulatory matters are further burdens (OECD 2004:
31). Over-regulation supports the shadow economy, which is extremely large. The OECD es-
timates its size as 52% of total employment, including agriculture, and 37% in private sector
employment excluding agriculture (OECD 2004: 145). Given the large negative effects of in-
formality on fiscal balances, tax wedges and productivity, an integrated strategy based on en-
EU Member Turkey?
27
forcement and economic incentives is required to reduce it. This would encompass less regu-
lation and a shifting of tax and social security charges away from labour.
Turkey’s main economic problem is macro-economic imbalances. Large-scale fluctua-
tions have been a prominent feature in recent years. Periods of growth follow financial crises,
which are then (partially) resolved through stabilisation policies that strive for internal and
external equilibrium and to re-establish growth. Observed over several periods, long-term
economic growth is receding and annual growth rates indicate volatile shifts. Turkey is the
only major emerging country that has not yet brought inflation under control (OECD 2002b),
although very recent indicators are more promising. Macro-economic instability is a principal
cause of inconsistent and generally disappointing economic growth.
Figure 2: Long-term Economic Growth and Inflation in Turkey 1981-2005
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Source: European Commission European Economy 2004. Changes in %, left axis growth, right axis inflation.
Enforcement of stabilisation measures in Turkey can only occur with external assis-
tance (IMF) and with political reform as a pre-requisite.
Against this background, Turkey (with IMF help) undertook several attempts at the end of the
1990s to correct macro-economic imbalances, especially high inflation and the poor condition
of public finances. The programs of 1998 and 1999 failed because of insufficient or leisurely
structural reforms, chiefly in the banking and fiscal sectors. This unfavourable development
led to a rapid rise in the real interest rate, placing great pressure on the budget and the econ-
omy in general. The Russian financial crisis and two catastrophic earthquakes further bur-
dened the fiscal balance and the economy.
The December 1999 stabilisation program of the new government had the ambitious goal
of defeating inflation. Its course and results showed the same pattern: initially a capital in-
flow, economic recovery, a distinct decrease in the real interest rate and an appreciation of the
currency could be observed. The obverse of this development was rising trade and current ac-
count deficits, worsening balance sheets of the banks, and increased exchange rate risks. In
the second half of 2000 the macro-economic situation deteriorated as booming domestic de-
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mand and the currency’s appreciation – accompanied by other adverse factors – led to a wid-
ening of the current account deficit to unprecedented levels (OECD 2002b: 176).
This deficit and connected exchange rate risks, along with the lethargic application of
structural reforms precipitated a retreat of foreign investors and financial turmoil in Novem-
ber 2000. Despite state intervention (guarantees for banks and the takeover of some credit in-
stitutes) the crisis worsened in February 2001 and led to the collapse of the crawling peg ex-
change rate (exchange rate as a nominal anchor) and a devaluation of the currency (IMF
2002a: 2).
Table 9: Attempts to Overcome the Turkish Economy’s Internal and External Imbalances
at the End of the 1990s
Year, Program
and Duration
Measures Results and Cause of failure or suc-
cess
Financial
Means
1998:
Staff Monitored
Program (SMP)
Envisaged Dura-
tion: 3 years
1. Fiscal Policy: several measures to in-
crease incomes (privatisation) and to cut
expenditure (indexation of public sector
salaries)
2. Monetary policy directed at sustaining
disinflation effort and exchange rate man-
agement to achieve inflation targets
3. Measures to strengthen the banking
sector and supervision
Some success in reducing inflation rate and
fiscal imbalances could be reached.
Several structural reform measures of the
SMP (telecommunication, energy sector,
social security system) were not imple-
mented. This caused high interest rates
none
1999
Disinflation Pro-
gram
Envisaged Dura-
tion: 3 years
exchange rate based disinflation and
monetary control by setting upper limits to
the NDA (Net Domestic Assets) position of
the Central Bank
1. Fiscal Policy: Raise the primary surplus
of the public sector (raise incomes: i.e. pri-
vatisation); cuts in non-investment public
expenditures.
2. Monetary and exchange rate policy:
More forward looking commitment on the
exchange rate
3. Income policy: indexation of civil servant
wages
4. Structural reforms: phasing out of the
existing indirect income support for farmers;
social security reforms: improve efficiency;
privatisation and banking reform.
In the first month economy stabilised and
returned to growth.
Inflation remained high and the Turkish Lira
appreciated. Along with booming domestic
demand this widened the current account
deficit. Lack of structural reforms raised
concerns about the continuity of the pro-
gram. Nominal interest rate increase again
provoking the first financial crisis in Nov.
2000. Despite government intervention the
crisis sharpened in February 2001 and the
crawling peg exchange rate had to be relin-
quished
Stand-by
arrangement
with the IMF
(US$ 4 bill.)
May 2001: Transi-
tion program for
strengthening the
economy
February 2002
Agreement with
the IMF
New program a stronger attempt to address
the fundamental weakness of the economy.
1. Fiscal Policy and Reforms: tightening of
fiscal policy combined with reforms in the
budgetary process
2. Monetary and exchange rate policy:
From 2001 to 2002 change from base
monetary targeting to Inflation targeting;
floating exchange rate
3. Rapid restructuring of the banking sector
4. New Privatisation drive and public sector
reforms
5. Enhanced social assistance to help low
income groups
In 2001 recession deeper than expected.
Growth picked up in 2002 and inflation is
reducing
In 2001 Turkish debt increase because of
banking sector bail out and deep devalua-
tion of the currency. In the following years
debt indicators improve
Devaluation = exchange rate stabilised,
short-term capital flows return
Banking sector reform is successful but still
state banks need to be privatised
Important structural fiscal reforms have
been implemented but the medium term
agenda in this field remains extensive
Privatisation is slow and social security re-
forms are in an early stage
Stand-by credit
from the IMF
(US$ 12.8 bill.)
Source: IMF (2002a), World Bank (2003)
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The structural weaknesses of the Turkish economy were clear. These included excessive
state influence (Gumpel 2004: 176), a frail banking system and, until 2001, careless fiscal and
monetary policies. Corruption and bureaucracy were further responsible for a very low level
of foreign direct investment (FDI). This currently reaches around US$1billion per year, which
is comparable to the smaller economies of Bulgaria and Romania (IMF 2004b: 10). In per
capita terms there is a vast difference to the CEECs. In 2002 Turkey’s FDI stock reached
roughly "  #$%&'	()$
*   
capita (Commission: 2003c). Unfortunately, this did not change substantially as the FDI flow
in 2003 was only marginal (see Table 10).
Again supported by the IMF, from May 2001 Ankara introduced promising reforms with
noteworthy results. Fiscal policy was tightened, the banking sector restructured, an ambitious
program of public sector change (structural measures, public expenditure management) be-
gan. There was also a renewed privatisation drive. Key regulatory and supervisory institu-
tions, such as the Turkish Central Bank and the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency,
gained independence (Commission 2004a: 58). Support for low-income groups, which were
hit harder by the crisis, provided some social cushioning. The program acquired additional
credits of US$10 billion from international financial institutions. It aimed to revitalise the in-
terest of investors, partly overcome shortages of finance, and promote reform of the banking
sector (IMF 2002a: 2).
Stabilisation policies and reforms begin to show successful results. Inflation de-
creases and growth develops.
The results of the stability measures are presently mixed as financial markets and the ex-
change rate remained fragile and inflation pressures were strong. The primary fiscal balance
turned to surplus but doubts persisted whether fiscal adjustment would be sustainable. High
interest rates, a significant depreciation of the currency, and the huge fiscal costs of bank re-
structuring, in combination with the deep recession, caused public debt to rise significantly
(from 57% of GNP in 2000 to 95% of GNP in 2001). The depth of the recession meant that
recovery only started in 2002 (World Bank 2003). At the same time the social costs of the
stabilisation program were high. Real wages decreased dramatically and unemployment rose
to 7.7% in 1999 and to 10.3% in 2002. The OECD (2004: 45) cites 16% in urban areas in the
first quarter of 2004. Youth unemployment increased in the same time-span from 15% to
20.5%.
High population growth will place pressure on the labour market in future. In addition, sig-
nificant underemployment.is partly reflected by the large informal sector (shadow economy).
This and structural change in agriculture (due to cuts in subsidies) will intensify the problems.
Large-scale job creation will be needed to absorb newcomers to the workforce. This necessi-
tates changes in labour market regulations. Rigid employment protection legislation and sub-
stantial labour tax and social contribution wedges hinder companies in responding to chang-
ing market conditions (OECD 2004: 23, 32).
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Table 10: Basic Macro-economic Data for Turkey
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20041 20051
GDP, real growth rate (in %) -4.7 7.4 -7.5 7.8 5.8 10.12
GNP, real growth rate (in %)3 -6.1 6.3 -9.5 7.8 5 5 5
Inflation rate (CPI, 12 month, end of period) 68.8 39.0 68.5 29.7 18,4 12 8
Average ex-ante interest rates (in %) 32.0 -9.5 35.5 30.3 28.6 11.2 10.6
Central government budget (overall, in %
GNP)
-10.6 -11.2 -19.9 -15.2 -11.3 -8.1 -4.2
Consolidated public sector (operational bal-
ance, in % of GNP)
-12.4 -6.9 -4.7 -4.5 -4.9 -2.5 -0.5
Net debt of public sector (in % of GNP) 61.0 57.4 93.9 79.2 70.9 66.5 60.3
Current Account (in % of GNP) -0.7 -4.9 2.4 -0.8 -2.9 -3.0 -2.4
Net external debt (in % of GNP) 33.6 38.8 53.8 54.1 44.1 36.8 34.1
FDI in % of GDP 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.5 0 -
Unemployment rate (in %) 7.7 6.5 8.3 10.3 9.0 12.42
Notes: 1  Projections; 2  First quarter; 
3 
.IMF data; Sources: IMF, European Commission, OECD; State Institute of Statistics.
Inflation and state debt have decreased. The CPI (Consumer Price Index) reduced from
29.7% in 2002 to 12% in mid 2004. Core inflation in the first half 2004 reached only 8%. In
2005 the CPI should be limited to single figures. Success in stabilisation attempts will be
partly manifested by a currency reform planned to take effect from 1 January 2005. The
Turkish Lira will be revalued and have six less zeroes. The economy grew 5.4% in 2003 with
a similar figure expected for 2004. However, on the external side some dangers emerged with
an increase in the current account deficit. This was mainly due to strong import growth of al-
most 3% of GDP in 2003. The current account deficit is expected to further widen in 2004
(OECD 2004: 42) and in the first half of the year it reached over 7% of GDP.
Turkey is in a consolidation phase that must be extended into a long-term trend of growth
and stability. This requires a consistent macro-economic policy (fiscal surplus, debt reduction,
control of inflation, sustainable current account deficit) and application of structural reforms,
among them reduction of the state’s presence in the economy, banking consolidation, privati-
sation and public sector reform (improvements in tax administration, better quality of spend-
ing). In December 2001 Turkey agreed on a medium-term program (worth US$ 3.8 billion)
worked out with the World Bank to assist in these tasks. It is supported by a US$18.6 billion
Stand-By Agreement with the IMF, making Turkey the Fund’s largest debtor. US$11 billion
of this was outlaid by April 2004 (IMF 2004a; 2004b).
5.2. The ‘Competitiveness’ Criterion is Harder to Achieve
Much more difficult to achieve is the second set of economic criteria, which requires that any
accession country is able to cope with competitive pressures associated with the single Euro-
pean market. The rationale behind this criterion is rooted in the fear that accession countries
might run into deep problems if not sufficiently prepared. Intensive competition within the
internal market could lead to high adaptation costs (enforced structural change, increased un-
employment) and thereby also cause social tensions that affect popular acceptance of the
European integration process.
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The Commission’s evaluation touches on many criteria, without pursuing a consistent
theoretical line. A quantification and appropriate ‘benchmarking’ in comparison with other
accession candidates is very difficult. For this reason the Commission’s measures are supple-
mented by the World Economic Forum’s bases for evaluating the competition capacity of in-
dividual countries.
Table 11: Criterion of ‘Competitiveness’ and its Evaluation by the Commission
Sub-Competition Criteria Evaluation of the Commission
1) Functioning market economy and macro-economic
stability
Progress in functionality of the market and strengthening
of the institutional environment; macro-economic stability
and predictability slowly gaining ground
2) Human- and physical capital provision Education levels have been improving from a low level.
The growth of the capital stock started to accelerate, but
FDI has remained limited; Infrastructure is fairly devel-
oped but investment has been limited and uneven.
3) Competition policy, state assistance, support for
SME’s
State interventions in the economy reduced
4) Company investment for restructuring and im-
proved performance; enterprise control
Restructuring of enterprises accelerated after the finan-
cial crisis, but slowed somewhat in 2003-2004
5) Integration level related to the EU economy; vol-
ume and structure of foreign trade
Trade interconnection stable, export composition im-
proved; despite volatile exchange rate Turkish exports
are competitive
6) Share and dynamic of SME’s Medium, small and micro family firms are the backbone
of the economy (in manufacturing: 30% of value added
and 60% of employment)
Source: Commission 2004a
Commission states that low investment in human and physical infrastructure weak-
ens competitiveness ...
An important aspect of the EU’s evaluation is whether Turkey has a sufficient endowment of
human and physical capital. Investment in these areas has been lacking in the past decade.
Physical infrastructure is very unevenly distributed across the country. Whereas the road net-
work is reasonably developed, especially in the industrial core regions and Western parts of
the country, the railway network urgently needs to be improved. The growth of the physical
capital stock has slowed as gross fixed investments declined over the last five years. FDI in-
flows are negligible. Failure to attract FDI is a major impediment to Turkey’s growth poten-
tial as it represents a missed opportunity to modernise the economy’s capital stock (Commis-
sion 2003c; 2004a).
... and further structural change and reforms are necessary to improve the competi-
tiveness of the Turkish economy
Further important areas for the Commission are legal security and structural factors. The
competitiveness criterion requires the establishment of a well-structured legal system with in-
centives to support a robust economic performance in the private sector. Laws affecting in-
dustrial organisation and degrees of competition have to be introduced not only formally but
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also in substance. State interference in the economy started to decline in Turkey but is still too
high. Progress in privatisation was rather limited in 2003 and the first half of 2004. Although
restructuring has accelerated due to structural reforms and budgetary constrains, Turkey still
faces the challenge of improving corporate governance and the restructuring of enterprises.
The transition from an agricultural to a service economy has continued but over 35% of the
labour force is still employed in the agricultural sector (EU-15: 1.7%). Small and medium-
sized enterprises are the stabilising core of the Turkish economy and are an important motor
for economic growth and structural change. A problem related to such firms is that they face
real limitations in their access to investment funds. They also have difficulties adapting EU
standards. Trade integration with the EU is high and the composition of exports has continued
to improve over the past few years. However, price competitiveness is volatile due to the in-
stability of the macro-economic framework.
World Economic Forum indicators suggest that Turkey’s competitiveness could be
compared to that of Bulgaria and Romania.
In order to compare the competitiveness of the Turkish economy with the EU and other can-
didate countries we use the WEF’s aggregated evaluation, which compares and estimates the
economic potential of over 100 countries. Table 13 presents the overall ‘Growth Competi-
tiveness Index’ (GCI) ranking, controlling for the current level of development (different
weights for country groups concerning technology and institutions). GCI measures the capac-
ity of national economies to achieve sustained growth over the medium term. The index con-
sists of three sub-indices: technology, public institutions and macro-economic environment.
Whereas a large difference exists between CEEC-Round-1 and CEEC-Round-2 (19 posi-
tions), the difference between Turkey and CEEC-Round 2 is not large (5 positions). The main
reason for Turkey’s bad ranking is the national macro-economic environment. If the Turkish
economy is stabilised, its growth potential is greater than that of Bulgaria and Romania. How-
ever, this is not the essential yardstick. A much better performance is necessary to assure a
successful catch up process.
In the category of macro-economic stability Turkey compares unfavourably
Turkey’s still precarious economic situation is reflected in various WEF (World Economic
Forum) indicators, among which macro-economic stability receives a particularly negative
evaluation for 2003. In a ranking of 102 countries, Turkey is placed near the bottom (94),
lower than Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey rates better (75) than these two in the category of
‘government waste’, which for the first time accounts for the scale of misused resources as
well as state deficits. In international credit ratings Turkey ranks 63, similar to the second
round of CEECs.3 In the overall evaluation of macro-economic conditions for 2003/2004
Turkey did not change substantially. The scores improved but the ranking remained nearly the
same (considering the different sample of countries). It is worse than Romania (71) and far
below the average of the first round of CEECs (43), Greece (31) and the EU-15 average (18).
                                                
3 This might have improved in 2003/2004 but sub-indices for 2004 were not available at time of writing.
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Table 12: WEF-Index 2003 and 2004: Macro-economic Environment Sub-Indices (Ranking)
Index Macro-economic
environment
Sub indices (2003)
2004
104 countries
2003
102 countries
Macro-
economic
Stability
Government
Waste
Credit-Rating
EU-15 18 16 36 23 11
  Finland 3 2  7  2 11
  Greece 31 33 45 49 23
CEEC-1 43 39 53 45 36
  Estonia 30 34 25 26 36
  Poland 51 49 62 65 33
CEEC-2 66 77 78 91 62
  Bulgaria 60 73 76 86 57
  Romania 71 81 81 96 66
Turkey 84
Score: 3.22
82
Score: 2.93
94 75 63
Note: The values of the country groups (CEEC-1, CEEC-2) represent the arithmetic average of the ranking position of the single
countries. Source: WEF 2003 and 2004, own calculations.
... if Turkey stabilises its economic and political situation growth will speed up
Another comprehensive measure employed by the WEF is the ‘Business Competitiveness In-
dex’ (BCI). The microeconomic approach focuses on comparing the complex array of na-
tional circumstances that support a high and sustainable level of productivity. This Index tries
to move beyond the examination of broad, aggregated variables and is computed by two sub-
indices (Company Operations and Strategy; Quality of National Business Environment), pri-
marily drawn from a survey of 4700 senior business leaders in 80 countries. Table 14 shows
that Turkey’s ranking is clearly better than that of Bulgaria and Romania but far behind the
average ranking of the CEEC-Round 1.
Table 13: Growth Competitiveness and Business Competitiveness Index (BCI)
and Related Sub-Indices (Rankings) 2004
Index Index Sub indices
Growth
Competitiveness
Business
Competitiveness
Company operations
and strategy
Quality of the national
business environment
EU-15 20 16 15 18
  Finland  1  2  7  1
  Greece 37 41 40 42
CEEC-1-Round 39 41 44 41
  Estonia 20 27 34 24
  Poland 60 57 47 64
CEEC-2-Round 61 65 74 65
  Bulgaria 59 75 86 72
  Romania 63 56 61 57
Turkey 66 52 44 55
Notes: The values of the country groups represent the arithmetic average of the ranking position of the single countries.
Source: WEF, authors’ calculations.
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Turkey experienced a dramatic decline in its business competitiveness compared to the
previous ranking (2001), which was not too far behind that of CEEC-Round-1. Its drop of 22
places was driven by a relative decline in factor quality (university-industry research collabo-
ration, quality of management schools, administrative burden of start ups) and the context for
strategy and rivalry (effectiveness of anti-trust policy). Company sophistication is estimated
more favourably, but technology licensing and staff training had suffered. The BCI-ranking is
nonetheless better the GCI-ranking. This may indicate that Turkey’s microeconomic com-
petitiveness has an upside potential.
Summing up: Turkey’s accession will present the EU with similar problems to those pre-
sented with Bulgaria and Romania. These two, however, are not the ‘benchmark’ for an ac-
cession to the EU. In comparison with them Turkey’s membership adds more heterogeneity.
Turkey has much greater internal disparities. Some growth regions and sectors can reach a
sufficient level of competitiveness and EU standards relatively quickly; others are underde-
veloped and will have to undergo massive structural changes in the coming years. This indi-
cates that Turkey will require a longer time-span to fulfil the criteria.
Meanwhile the EU ‘club’ will have a strong bias towards low and medium income ‘catch-
up countries’ with far-reaching implications for major EU policies. This trend makes it ques-
tionable whether the internal market can develop its full potential. Figure 3 shows that the
GCI is closely correlated with per capita income levels. In order to improve or sustain the in-
tegrative capacities of the internal market and the competitiveness of the entire Union, it may
be prudent to set a threshold value for convergence in real terms and in the competitiveness of
countries, which must be reached before they can accede to the EU. A scholarly founded ap-
praisal of where such a threshold should lie is not so simple. An evaluation of this type re-
quires more than the WEF Indices. Additional forms of measurement would have to be devel-
oped.
Figure 3: Growth Competitiveness Index (Scores) and Per Capita GDP
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6. Consequences of a EU Membership for Turkey
For aspirant countries, the objective of EU membership should be based on rational political
and economic decisions and not be a question of ‘honour’. A politically rational argument can
be made for wanting greater stability and for desiring influence over decisions that one-self
will in any case be affected by. The aim for growth, welfare and financial transfers that are to
some degree all likely to occur as a consequence of membership is economically rational.
This will not, however, be without costs. Every club has its own rules, preferences and entry
preconditions, which are often bound with the availability of resources and investment re-
quirements. Some investments may be covered by development goals (presuming these are
accomplished); others may be a burden indefinitely. How does a realistic potential balance for
Turkey look?
The Implementation of the acquis will be a major problem for Turkey
Apart from the economic and political Copenhagen Criteria, acceptance and implementation
of the entire legal corpus, the acquis communataire, is also a requisite for membership. This is
not easy and has its costs, especially for countries at a less advanced stage of economic devel-
opment, which applies to most new or potential EU entrants. In purely formal terms the eco-
nomic disparities between Turkey and the EU (as already experienced with the eastern en-
largement) are not grounds for the refusal to begin negotiations or, more so, to reject member-
ship. Real convergence is not an entry condition, regardless of the massive problems that
variations in income and economic development may lead to.
Figure 4: Correlation between per Capita GDP and Public Institution Index (2003)
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There is substantial evidence to support that a country’s level of economic development is
correlated with the quality of its institutions and ‘social capital’ (see figure 4); that is, with
factors that are decisive for successful integration in a progressively deepening EU internal
market. As Section 4 showed, even optimistic prognoses suggest it will take many decades
before the income differential between Turkey and the EU-15 has noticeably reduced. Weak
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institutions can therefore be a major barrier to successful adoption of the EU’s communal le-
gal corpus and obligations. In this regard Turkey is evaluated by the WEF index as very
similar to Bulgaria and is distinctly better that Romania. With EU support Turkey’s institu-
tional capacity can increase significantly in the longer term.
The list of adaptation measures noted in the Commission’s regular report (2004a) is long
and it will be many years until the acquis is sufficiently imposed. The EU will supervise the
factual implementation of the communal legal corpus very closely. The experience of the
NMC’s indicates that Turkey will have serious problems in the areas of agricultural policy
(standards and norms), regional policy (administrative capacity) and environmental and social
standards. Shortcomings in justice and home affairs and consumer and health protection will
also be present for some years.
At the present time, before negotiations have commenced and not all details are available,
a sweeping speculative analysis does not seem appropriate. However, some aspects are note-
worthy because they affect the existing state of integration. These relate to Free Movement of
Goods and the Customs Union where Turkey lacks sufficient progress in legislation and re-
ducing state aid. The Commission (2004a) concludes that alignment with the acquis is at an
early stage for most chapters and further work is required in all areas.
Cultural difference should not in principle exclude a country from accession to the
EU, though it should be dependent upon the agreement of the European citizenry.
The issue of Turkey‘s cultural belonging to Europe has a ‘Turkish’ and a ‘European’ dimen-
sion. The meeting of these dimensions is another example of a recurring theme: whether and
if so to what extent differing cultural backgrounds hinder integration (Wehler 2002; Winkler
2003). That would occur if a particular culture’s rules, organisations and social norms under-
mined the effective implementation of commonly accepted European values. The reasoning
for this argument is not so convincing in the case of Turkey. It is correct that there is no cate-
gorical ‘Muslim democracy’, meaning a polity in which a majority of citizens are of this faith
and the state functions, without serious reproach, according to democratic norms (Jenkins
2003). Turkey comes closest and is moving further in this direction. Along the way it has had
difficulties in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. However, this could only partly be explained
by its Islamic culture, as Turkey has been an insistently secular state.
The ‘cultural argument’ is also questionable from a more fundamental viewpoint. Although
based on ‘European’ history and its socio-cultural mores – leaving aside the hugely illiberal
phenomena of fascism and communism – the Copenhagen Criteria should be treated as uni-
versally acceptable and potentially achievable by any society. This does not mean that there
will not be implementation problems. As demonstrated in Section 3, Turkey has made great
steps towards becoming a western style polity. It has not completed this process and still is
regionally and culturally a divided country: modernised cities are contrasted by backwards re-
gions. It cannot be determined a priori whether Turkey will successfully complete its trans-
formation. Though many political actors and intellectual commentators impress it, we do not
consider Turkey’s democratisation (or that of any other country) as constituting an argument
for its acceptance by the EU per se.
Turkey’s ‘Europeanisation’ will not occur without risks. Full implementation of demo-
cratic rights and freedoms is a challenge for both Turkey and the EU. Potential shifts to radi-
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calism or even a theocratic regime are presently guarded against by the Turkish military. Si-
multaneously, however, the military’s role as ultimate arbiter is problematic when viewed
through the prism of the Copenhagen political criteria. The retreat of the military from super-
vision of the political process – which is underway – has to lead to a sustainable democracy
(Bocklet 2004: 169). If Turkish society and the state is fully accepting of what this entails:
Human Rights, religious freedom, equality for women, and so on, then cultural arguments
against a Turkish EU entry would be weakened. It cannot be proved in advance that due to its
Islamic tradition, Turkish society will reject the basic norms of the European value commu-
nity in the mid- and long-term. If there were a culturally motivated backlash, the EU would
have enormous problems. If such a development occurred during the accession process it
would precipitate an immediate interruption of negotiations. If it was to occur after Turkey
had been accepted as a member it would require the application of comprehensive sanction
mechanisms. This could have far-reaching foreign policy consequences for the West and in-
ternal effects of a similar magnitude on Turkey. In this case a quasi-democracy guided by the
military (as in the past) would, for the West, be preferable to a theocratic regime.
The ‘European dimension’ noted above is virtually synonymous with ‘European identity’.
Two components are predominant in our context: ‘European Solidarity’ and anxiety about
‘Islamic infiltration’. The latter is based on deeply rooted, if now irrational, resentments and
even fears going back to Muslim invasions of Europe in the 8th Century, Ottoman occupations
of the Balkans from the 14th Century, and the empire’s defeat before Vienna in 1683. Compe-
tition Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, a prominent sceptic of Turkish EU membership has
made reference to this (Bolkestein 2004; Vannahme 2004). The contemporary manifestation
is fear of massive migration from Turkey to Europe (mainly to Germany) and the expansion
of existing ‘Islamic enclaves’. This problem has many aspects (socio-economic, educational,
linguistic), which cannot be extensively discussed here. Migration pressure could be con-
trolled to some degree by instituting temporary or permanent transition periods (see Section
8). But ambivalence runs deeper because Turkey would be a major power in Europe with the
capacities to strongly influence EU decision-making.
This is why ‘European solidarity’ is crucial. The EU is conceived as a union of states and
citizens, oriented to provide mutual security and welfare. As a union of citizens, therefore, EU
membership means more than accession to a multilateral community of states. Previous en-
largements have not elicited misgivings about their exceeding the EU’s cultural or geographic
framework, which is not to discount that there was resistance for other reasons. The basic
consensus rests on a sufficiently communal cultural lineage (Christianity, Humanism, the En-
lightenment, critical scientific rationalism) and is represented by important pillars of the
European states (legal system, separation of powers, free elections, civilian predominance in
institutions). There is also a historical and moral commitment to unify the continent after it
was torn apart by two world wars (originating from it) and subsequently divided during the
Cold War.
‘European identity’ is a theme that has been copiously discussed without definitive an-
swers on its origin, content, range and implications. The more important practical issue is
whether ‘European identity’ is intrinsic to solidarity among member states: in the form of fi-
nancial transfers, communal embassies, Schengen, and so on. Could this solidarity be legiti-
mated, or even exist, without a sustainable ‘European we-feeling‘? (Winkler 2002) Common
European understanding about the conceptual approaches to community policies, along with
their scope, financial magnitude and distributional effects, is already fragile. If the opinion
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that Turkey does not culturally and historically belong to Europe solidifies among EU popu-
lations, then - whether this estimation is correct or false - the EU may experience an identity
crisis and further deepening processes will be blocked. On the other hand, the prospect of
Turkey acceding to the EU may stimulate a common (negative) response among large num-
bers of its citizens that would generate, in an unintended way, a popular form of European
unity. The Commission, in an understated manner, noted that its October 2004 recommenda-
tion provides the basis for the Council to make a decision of ‘general political importance’ for
the future of the European Union. It seems unavoidable, however, that a possible EU mem-
bership for Turkey must involve a direct decision of European citizens. The form and timing
of such public participation will be a matter of controversial debate.
A EU Perspective supports reforms but is itself no guarantee of success.
Positive political and economic effects of a EU perspective on Turkey are frequently im-
pressed. While this is an important argument, it does not necessitate unconditional full mem-
bership, which cannot substitute for Turkey’s own required efforts. Moreover, in the eco-
nomic policy area the IMF is Turkey’s most important partner, even if it and the EU work, as
in central and eastern Europe, hand in hand.
Table 14: Potential Welfare Gains for Turkey through EU Integration
(in various studies – long-term steady state effects)
Study Scope Effect-Mechanism and/or
Method
Effect-Quantification
Harrison et al (1997) Custom Union since 1996 Elimination of tariffs and non-
tariff trade barriers, harmoniza-
tion etc.
1.1 % of Turkey’s GDP per year
Togan (2004) Trade Liberalisation Gravity Model on Trade 1.5 % of per capita income per
year
Lejour et al (2004) Trade Liberalisation
Institutional Reforms
Computable General Equilibrium
Model of World Trade
Effects through trade: 0.8 % of
GDP; 1.4% of consumption.
Institutional effects 5.6% of
GDP, 8.9% of consumption
Own estimates
(Quaisser and Rep-
pegather 2004)
All integration effects Estimates based on the model
calculations related to the East-
ern enlargement of the EU
2.5% to 5%; With FDI: up to
10% of Turkish GDP
There should be no illusions regarding the potential scale of positive integration effects.
Because of already existing trade (customs union) and capital liberalisation, the immediate
(statistical) economic effects of Turkey’s membership for the EU will be marginal: less than
0.1% of GDP. This is also related to the small size of the Turkish economy (2% of the EU-25)
and its limited trade importance for the EU (2% to 3% of the trade volume). During the last
decades Turkey shifted its trade remarkably towards the EU (58% share of exports) but its
trade share is still below of those of the NMC’s (EU share about 70%).
For Turkey this will be in the region of 2.5% to 5% of GDP and may be higher if dynamic
effects, primarily FDI, occur. Under favourable circumstances positive effects could be dou-
bled (around 10% of GDP). A EU perspective would support greater political stability, which
in turn encourages the flow of FDI. Notwithstanding this, national economic policy will re-
main decisive for successful convergence. It must also be taken into account that the above
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mentioned effects could also occur through an extension of the customs union and phased in-
tegration into the internal market – without a full EU membership being required.
Costs of EU convergence for Turkey.
The economic gains of EU entry have to be balanced against the outlays, which are difficult
to quantify and evaluate, especially as they are linked to positive side-effects. Costs arise
through the taking on of norms and standards. These will primarily burden Turkish small en-
terprises oriented to production for the local market. Then come social and environmental
standards, conceived for highly developed countries, which could adversely affect the inter-
nationally competitive position of those in transition. The European model of the social wel-
fare state and over-regulation – with huge transfers to poorer members - is in crisis and can
hardly be considered as a model for progression. In fact there exists only one clear success
story, Ireland, which in addition to benefiting from EU redistribution also introduced radical
changes to tax rates, attracted FDI, and invested heavily in education and technology. Its
population is English-speaking, which gave Ireland an advantage that others, including Tur-
key, do not have.
On the other hand there are in the medium and long-term also positive social outcomes:
among them, a ban on child labour and formal equality of men and women. Long transition
periods are envisaged before the full introduction of EU environmental standards in areas that
do not concern the internal market. Difficult adaptation is also certain for competition policy.
As for the internal market, Brussels enjoys extensive powers and Turkey will be forced to
comply with strict rules. The possibility of a selective subsidy and protectionist policy, like
those pursued by other transition countries, with varying results, will be minimal and must be
approved by the Commission. As an offset, Ankara can reckon with high EU transfer pay-
ments for rural regions, though the strong pressures for migration will thereby not be stopped.
Admission to the CAP means advantages for Turkish consumers but disadvantages
for Turkish farmers. Transfer payments from Brussels can partly alleviate this.
The Turkish agricultural sector employs around 34% of the total workforce, comparable with
Romania. It is characterised by subsistence and semi-subsistence farming with very low pro-
ductivity, hidden unemployment and low competitiveness. Of about 3 million holdings (com-
pared to 6.8 million in the EU-15 and 6 million in the NMCs) small farms are dominant. 65%
of peasants operate farms of less than 5 ha of agricultural land. The large size of the sector has
motivated concerns about the implications of its integration into the CAP. Membership will
mean that Turkey’s agricultural trade with the rest of the EU will be liberalised and prices will
move towards equilibrium. High Turkish subsidies, and concurrently the income of farmers,
will sink. Negative effects can be expected for rural areas where income levels are already
about a quarter below those of the cities (Grethe 2004). On the other hand, lower food prices
will raise the welfare levels of most Turkish consumers and in particular low-income groups
(in total by 0.4% of GDP).
As a partial equalisation for its farmers Turkey will receive EU transfer payments for rural
regions (a maximum of +		
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produce market should be limited because of lower price and volume effects and/or because it
is absorbed by a general trend of agricultural liberalisation and lower producer prices.
Turkey is currently implementing a programme to restructure the farm sector and publicly
funded support. The objective of this policy change is to phase out price support and credit
subsidies and to remove the state from direct involvement in the production process. A Direct
Income Support system (DIS), based on land rather than inputs and outputs, is being intro-
duced. It is estimated that 75% of Turkish farms are eligible for DIS. The basic idea of the
system corresponds to the EU income support system, which will gradually be delinked from
the means of production (land and animals). The reform promises to increase the efficiency of
agricultural policy but it remains to be seen how this policy shift will effect rural economies
as a whole, considering that Turkey is directing a substantial 4.1% of its GDP to agricultural
support (Commission [DG Agriculture] 2003b).
The costs of structural change will be only partly compensated through EU structural
and regional policies:
In the event of a Turkish accession the EU’s structural and regional policies will be faced with
massive challenges. Besides problems of administrative capacity (for both sides) the financial
implications are disquieting. Along with the considerable development gap to the EU at the
national level are regional disparities greater than in any EU country. As one of the poorest
members Turkey will be eligible for the full benefits of the most important programs. In
status quo structural policy terms virtually the entire country will qualify as an Objective 1
zone and receive up to 4% of GDP in support. This would mean about "		
  ,
(see Section 8).
Such a level of transfer contributions is for the initial years rather unlikely. Nonetheless,
the dimensions of these potential financial receipts give some indication of the tasks facing
the Turkish administrative, political and fiscal sectors in a pre-accession period. This is mag-
nified by comparison with the present state of affairs whereby financial support is fairly mod-
est (about 0.1 % of Turkish GDP). In the next EU financial period, if negotiations on mem-
bership begin, a yearly pre-accession assistance for Turkey of about   		
  "0 

GDP) can be expected.
7. Political-strategic Arguments in Favour of Turkey’s Accession to the
EU are not Entirely Convincing.
As the EU can hardly expect substantial, if any, economic advantages should Turkey join, the
arguments in favour of Turkish membership concentrate on foreign policy considerations.
There are frequent assertions that accession negotiations will have positive effects on Euro-
pean security, on the Turkish reform process, and on the Islamic world (as a counter model to
fundamentalist Islam). Many leading politicians stress this line of argument. It corresponds to
the American strategic estimation and is noted in the Commission’s recent Impact Study
(Commission 2003b). In this context there are frequent references to ‘11 September’. The
threat of Islamic terrorism was emphasised most fervently by the German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer. In an interview with the BBC he compared the entry of Turkey into the EU
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with the Allies’ Normandy invasion in 1944. According to Fischer the modernisation process
necessary for the secular Muslim state to join the EU ‘would be almost a D-Day in the war
against terror’ and ‘the greatest positive challenge for these totalitarian and terrorist ideas.’
(Cf. BBC 20 October 2004; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 20 October 2004).
Leaving this somewhat melodramatic formulation aside, if one accepts that there is a real
danger of Turkey sliding towards becoming a theocracy and that the EU could prevent this,
then this would be a powerful argument.4 This may mean a complete revaluation of the EU’s
self-conception and ambitions. A shift of accent in the European visions of some important
politicians, perhaps before all Fischer (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 6 March 2004), is al-
ready noticeable. The goal of a political union has moved to the background. It appears that
the EU shall now, with Turkey’s help, operate globally as a strategic actor alongside the USA
and provide additional assistance in stabilising a crisis-wracked, but for the West essential
(because of oil, the terrorist threat, and potentially dangerous unsavoury regimes) region.
There is no doubt that a stable democratic Turkey would play a strategically important role
for the EU. It is not at all certain that this could only occur in the framework of a full mem-
bership. A strategic partnership and ‘traditional’ foreign policy could provide the EU with
much greater manoeuvrability to pursue its own interests. In this context NATO seems to
have been undervalued, by both European members and the US. This is part of a larger inter-
national game.
A perspective of EU membership supports Turkey’s internal reform process. And it is of-
ten pronounced that without such a perspective many reforms would not have been introduced
or at least not implemented at this speed. It would however be a bold thesis that argued that
the success or failure of the reforms is dependent on the EU. The modernisation process can-
not be steered by the Brussels bureaucracy. There is also an apparent contradiction here: on
one hand, the European values of democracy and human rights, manifestly established in state
and society, are pre-conditions for the commencement of negotiations; on the other hand, it is
a perspective of accession to the EU that, some contend, will motivate, develop and eventu-
ally secure these values throughout Turkey’s political and social structures. Arguments that
entry to the EU is imperative for modernisation are further weakened by the firm emphasis of
Turkish politicians that a continuation of reforms is in Turkey’s interest independently of the
EU decision.
If the strategic argument is pursued further then it must also be valid for an even more
critical actor, namely Russia, which has enormous oil and gas reserves, a large military, is a
nuclear power, and is also menaced by terrorism. In this case an overburdening of the EU
could hardly be concealed, though it simultaneously reveals a failure to effectively conceptu-
alise long-term strategic partnerships with important neighbours. The EU is increasingly
compelled to guarantee stability and security on the continent and environs, which also means
ensuring its own functionality. There are accession obligations towards Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, and perspectives for Croatia and other countries of South-Eastern Europe will follow.
This will require considerable resources for a long time into the future. A policy regarding
other eastern countries must also be developed.
EU accession for Turkey is not the means by which to hinder a ‘Clash of Civilisations’ and
strengthen a westernised (that is, manageable) Islam. Its rather low esteem in the Middle East,
                                                
4 A balanced discussion of the strategic arguments and other pro and cons of Turkey’s EU membership can be
found in Kramer (2003).
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and indeed tense relations with some neighbours, means that any notion of Turkey’s func-
tioning as a model for other Islamic states to emulate is hard to support, even if Turkey is
working hard to achieve this (Cf. Beris 2004). Any implicit threats by Turkey that, in the
event of a rejection by the EU, it has strategic alternatives are thereby relativised. More daring
is the vision of ‘Europe as global power’ (Cf. Guérot and Witt 2004). The EU is for the fore-
seeable future neither capable in terms of material resources nor politically prepared to play
such a role. In this context the statements by Commissioner Verheugen, that he could not
imagine a EU enlarged to include Turkey without a CFSP, are noteworthy (Emerson and
Tocci 2004). In operational terms, such a policy is in its infancy. A EU with Turkey would
indeed have more military-strategic weight but variable interests in specific instances will
make it more difficult to reach agreement. Turkey borders on many crisis zones and it cannot
be excluded that Ankara will have different foreign policy priorities to many if not all (other)
EU states.
Some scholars (Aydin and Keyman 2004) and political figures (Yilmaz 2004) argue, quite
plausibly, that Turkey’s cultural-religious identity and geographic location cannot and should
not be deployed as tools of argument against a Turkish EU accession. Both logically, and
following a ‘principle of fairness’, Turkey must be evaluated solely by the same benchmarks,
rules and standards – the Copenhagen Criteria – that other candidates have been judged by
(and which should also apply to old members). ‘Culturalist’ references and the use of religion
or geography as factors are then, it is argued, inapplicable. Yet what are the major arguments
or assertions made by almost all those political actors and academic analysts who support an
imminent commencement of negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the EU?
The core of this argumentation is: geography and religion. That is, it combines the factors
of a critical geo-strategic location and a primarily Islamic society of some 70 million people,
and emphasises that these are present in an era when the wrong political signals or develop-
ments could be explosive for Turkey and an already wayward immediate neighbourhood, with
grave consequences for Europe (and the United States). Therefore, with the spectre of 11
September omnipresent, the line of reasoning suggests that it is necessary to integrate Turkey
further and faster into the West. And the EU serves as the best available vehicle to do this.
This could also be expressed in a more rudimentary fashion: if culture/religion and geography
cannot be the basis of an argument for keeping Turkey out of the EU, it cannot be the basis of
an argument for admitting Turkey into the EU.
8. Membership for Turkey would have Far-reaching Implications for the EU
A decision on commencing accession negotiations with Turkey cannot be made without dis-
cussion on the possible consequences for the EU. This touches on the ‘third Copenhagen Cri-
teria’, the capacity of the Union to cope with further enlargements. In the original long-
version text of the Copenhagen Criteria (which cannot be found in the Commission’s web-site
archives) ‘the capacity of the EU to integrate new members’ is stressed as an important ele-
ment to be considered before any negotiations are commenced (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung 14 October 2004). Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen gave the impression that such
a discussion was politically unwelcome. He noted that it was not known - projected to some
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future unnamed date when Turkey might enter - how the EU would be organised and that
speculation was therefore futile (Spiegel Online 27 February 2004). In later interviews he
conceded that such a discussion was unavoidable and that he would commission a study on
the theme (AFP 13 May 2004). The Commission, with encouragement from the European
Parliament, produced its own impact study on the effects of Turkish membership on the Un-
ion (Commission 2004b).
Eastern enlargement and a possible Turkish EU membership is shifting the voting
power in the EU towards the cohesion countries.
The eastern enlargement changed the EU from a group of predominantly rich industrial coun-
tries to a heterogeneous club of states with enormous economic disparities. The significance
of the cohesion countries (those with income levels under 90% of the EU average) has grown.
If one compares the old EU-15 in 2001 with a EU-28 including Turkey in 2013, then the co-
hesion countries will increase in number from three to at least fifteen and their population
share will rise from 16% to 36%. Their voting weight in the EP will increase from 18% to
41% and, according to the Nice IGC, to 43% in the Council. In contrast to this their share of
total EU economic performance will remain at about 10%. Even under the double majority
voting system proposed in new constitutional treaty, the influence of the cohesion countries
will remain strong (53% of states and 36% of the EU population).
This, relative to economic strength, disproportionate power shift in favour of the cohesion
countries would be accompanied by tremendous hazards, particularly in view of the expan-
sion of those policy areas that have the largest budgets and financial implications. Growing
disparities in income, economic structures, and trade orientation, would weaken the internal
coherence and goal specificity of European economic and monetary policies. Social cohesion
would come under challenge. While the industrial core countries are concerned with securing
and extending their competitiveness in high-technology fields (Lisbon agenda), the cohesion
countries must introduce a successful convergence process – for Turkey this also means over-
coming typical problems of underdevelopment in some regions – and integrate themselves ef-
fectively into the European division of labour (sectoral specification).
Table 15: Significance of Cohesion Countries in Different Scenarios1
(Share in % of each respective EU)
Cohesion
Countries
Population2 Votes in Par-
liament
Council Votes
(Nice)3
GDP4
EU-15, 2001 20 16.2 17.9 21.5 10.2
EU-25, 2004 52 29.9 36.1 42.1 14.3
EU-28, 2013 53 36.0 40.7 43.0   9.8
  Of this, Turkey     3.6 14.2 11.2   7.8   3.0
Note: 1 Cohesion countries lie under the 90% income threshold of the combined EU, measured by GDP per capita in the year
noted. 2 For 2004, population for 2001; for 2013, medium prognosis of the UN; 3 According to the Treaty of Nice;4 For determin-
ing respective GDP per capita income and the GDP of the EU-15, a 2% rate, for the first enlargement round a 4% rate, and for
the second enlargement round a 5% real growth rate, are applied. Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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The Commission’s impact study is very general and does not sufficiently illuminate
the effects on the Union.
The impact study (Commission 2004b) requested of the Commission by the EP and some
member states represents only an initial assessment. On the bases of size, situation, and eco-
nomic and military potential, Turkey’s accession is assessed as incomparable, though in geo-
strategic and security policy terms as advantageous. It is envisaged that Turkey could take on
a stabilising function for the entire region, even if the CFSP may concurrently run into diffi-
culties. Additionally, potential problems related to the control of the EU’s external borders are
highlighted. Security policy questions such as the containment of organised crime, smuggling
and terrorism, represent enormous challenges.
Because of Turkey’s, in comparison to the EU, limited economic power, and liberalisation
introduced by the Customs Union, the economic effects on the EU are assessed as rather in-
significant. The effects for Turkey are evaluated as positive. Here, however, generally ex-
pected growth and productivity effects are mixed with others that occur directly (participation
in the internal market) or indirectly (political effects as a consequence of higher investment)
from membership. Structural adaptation processes that could have retrospective effects on the
EU are addressed. In particular this focuses on increased migration pressures, which with ref-
erence to various studies are quantified as between 0.5 and 4 million persons. Turkey’s high
rate of population growth could have positive effects on the ageing EU.
In contrast to previous announcements, including from the Enlargement Commissioner, the
Commission also undertook an initial estimation of budgetary effects. In the framework of the
present acquis, press reports on a first version of the impact study mentioned net costs for the
year 2025 of between  		
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published version the ‘hypothetical’ net costs are posited as 0.17% of EU GDP in 2025. A
presumption here is that costs related to Turkey’s accession could only be evaluated on the
basis of the financial perspective from 2014; implicitly an accession of Turkey is regarded as
possible only after 2013. It is emphasised, nonetheless, that no further entry criteria should be
introduced. In regard to institutional effects the document is very general. New voting weights
in the Parliament and the Council (population component) are noted. In light of forthcoming
reductions in its numbers and a proposed rotation system from 2014, direct effects of a Turk-
ish accession on the Commission are not expected.
The Commission summarises that the ‘Accession of Turkey to the Union would be chal-
lenging for both the EU and Turkey. If well managed, it would offer important opportunities
for both’ (Commission 2004b: 3; 2004c: 4). Although because of uncertain parameters (time
and form of accession, condition of the Union, acquis at the time of accession) the Commis-
sion must necessarily remain rather vague in its prognoses, it sees more chances than risks. In
the longer term it cannot be disguised that Turkey’s accession will have extensive effects on
the EU. This is expressed in regard to regulations on migration, where the possibility of a
‘permanent safeguard clause’ is raised, and also financing. The comment that the process is
uncertain in terms of outcomes and will last many years (10 to 15), and the proposals for re-
strictive negotiation procedures, indicates that ‘mixed feelings’ also existed in the Commis-
sion and perhaps the Enlargement Directorate itself.
Commissioner Verheugen’s remarks in a recent television interview (N-TV 6 October
2004), that a positive recommendation for Turkey may turn out to be a mistake, reflects some
of this uncertainty. Turkey’s unpredictability stimulates many questions. One of the most ba-
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sic is, should a state that – tacitly, implicitly, indirectly, or in any other way – threatens to
adopt an antagonistic posture towards the EU (as Turkey did in 1997 and on other occasions),
and even to head in an anti-democratic direction, if it is not granted official negotiations on
membership, ever be accepted as a member? For a state to take such a course suggests that
democratic instincts and practices are not deeply rooted in its political culture.
Full-integration of Turkey in EU expenditure policies would cause high costs. Reform
pressure on the EU agricultural and structural policies increases.
The chance to implement genuine major reforms of the CAP and structural policy was missed
before the eastern enlargement. Some changes in the CAP (de-coupling of income support
from the means of production) will help to reduce expenditure in future, but much remains to
be done. In structural and cohesion policy a concentration on fewer objectives is indicated,
but the debate is focused on different phasing-in (new member states) and phasing-out (old
member states) schemes. Considering the enormous challenges that the enlarged EU faces in
order to promote a successful convergence process, this is a major disappointment.
Against this background the EU’s acceptance of Turkey is a risky venture. Projections ini-
tially indicated a moderate cost: an entry scenario of 		
 year in net transfers, but
which could, with full integration into community policies in their present form, rise to ,
billion yearly (Quaisser and Reppegather 2004). Projections of this nature were previously de-
rided as panic inducing and, simultaneously, not to be taken seriously.5 Moreover it is under-
scored that all relevant cost factors can be politically influenced. It is presently unclear pre-
cisely what EU expenditures at the time of a possible Turkey entry will be. The political deci-
sion process will involve the positing of status quo scenarios in order to calculate the extent of
necessary reforms.
What has become increasingly clear is that an accession of Turkey cannot be transmitted to
the European publics without a concurrent assessment of the consequences for the EU. Even
before the Commission’s Regular Report and Issues Paper were completed, figures from the
Directorate-General for Agriculture (headed by the Austrian Commissioner Franz Fischler)
appeared in the press. These indicated that agricultural costs alone could reach "		
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For our calculations it seems reasonable to accept the Commission’s forecasts. Employing
these we also revise the costs for administration and internal policies from  
l-
lion.
Revision of earlier cost projections (Quaisser and Reppegather 2004) is also necessary be-
cause new GDP figures for Turkey and new growth prognoses influence the projections for
structural expenditures and Turkey’s own contributions to the community budget. Addition-
ally, the price basis and the possible year of entry to the EU have been changed. The figures
                                                
5 Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen (Spiegel Online 2004) was prominent in making such state-
ments. For the previous eastern enlargement he had suggested that uncertainty, including for the cost, was an in-
trinsic feature of the project (Der Spiegel 13 September 1999: 220-224).
6 Calculations by Grethe (2004) are based on equilibrium modelling of the Turkish agricultural sector, taking its
structural specificities into account. The main difference between his and the Commission’s calculations is that
Grethe applies the real devaluation of nominal fixed amounts for direct payments. In different reform scenarios
he additionally assumes a 3% cut in direct payments yearly.
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correspond to constant prices for 2004 (previously 1999) and an accession is now forecast for
2014 because this coincides with the commencement of a new finance period (following the
period which begins in 2007). These alterations enable a necessary updated calculation (better
comparability).
For an accession in 2014 we predict, in an entry scenario, a net transfer of + 		
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half of expenditures (obligations) going to the NMC’s in 2006. If in 2014 Turkey is com-
pletely integrated into the EU’s expenditure policies the net contribution would rise to about
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expenditures for new members in 2014. The Commission estimates total net transfers to a
maximum of 		
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about 0.16% of EU-28 GDP). If reforms (primarily a limiting of structural funds to 2% of
Turkish GDP) are enforced, these estimates would be reduced down to ,		
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EU-28 GDP). Against this background, there is a certain irony about Commissioner Ver-
heugen’s critique of some earlier cost projections.
Table 16: Cost of a EU Accession by Turkey in 2014 (   		
 
Entry Scenario
(corresponding to the first enlargement round, expenditure for 2006)
Transfers in total 10.2
  Agricultural expenditure (with 35% direct payments) 2.9
  Structural funds (1.4% of GDP) 4.7
  Other (administration, internal policy areas) 2.6
Own contributions (0.5% of GDP) 1.7
Net transfer 8.5
Germany's financial contribution (20%) 1.7
Authors Scenario of Full Integration in EU Policies (2014)
(with 100% of direct payments and 4% of GDP as absorption limit)
Transfers in total 24.2
 Agricultural expenditure (with 100% direct payments) 8.2
 Structural funds (4% of GDP) 13.4
Other (administration, internal policy areas) 2.6
Own contributions (1% of GDP) 3.3
Net transfer 20.9
Germany's financial contribution (20%) 4.2
Commission Scenario of Full Integration in EU Policies (2025)
(with 100% of direct payments and 4% of GDP as absorption limit)
Transfers in total 33.2
 Agricultural expenditure (with 100% direct payments) 8.2
 Structural funds (4% of GDP) 22.4
Other (administration, internal policy areas) 2.6
Own contributions 5.6
Net transfer 27.6 (Reform: 16.4)
Germany's financial contribution (18%)* 5.0 (Reform: 3.0)
Note: *The German contribution is reduced according to its declining GDP share. Source: Authors calculations, European
Commission (2004a)
Table 17 shows that calculations by Quaisser and Reppegather (2004) of ,		
	)
deviate from those of other authors. Our current higher figures are based on the Commission’s
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own assumptions and some technical changes (new price basis and growth projections). The
net costs (based on unchanged policies) estimated in various studies range from +		


,		
!
	
$
;
Firstly, it is correct – as the Commission also remarks – that all calculations are specula-
tive, because all modalities and the timing of an accession, as well as the configuration of EU
policies at that time, are unknown.
Secondly, status-quo scenarios show that full integration of Turkey into EU policies repre-
sents a considerable financial burden.
Thirdly, if considered in isolation this disbursement could be manageable, though because
of the questionable ‘efficiency’ of these policies it can hardly be justified.
Fourthly, in combination with constantly rising expenditures for new member countries,
and those required for further ancillary enlargements (Bulgaria, Romania, other Balkan states)
as well as those for new tasks (foreign and security policy, Lisbon process), the funds to pay
for transfers to Turkey may have to be obtained through an increase in the budget (which
means tax rises) or cuts in receipts for current members. Either would provoke acute political
difficulties.
Fifthly, within a framework of comprehensive reforms in EU policies, solutions that would
make an accession by Turkey financially bearable could be found. But it remains open
whether these reforms have a realistic chance.
Sixthly, alternatives are founded on the formulation of special conditions for Turkey. The
disadvantage here is that this would be very difficult to impose and would lead to permanent
conflict with Ankara.
Table 17: Other Estimates on the Budgetary Consequences for the EU
Study Projected Year Method Transfer Yearly
Flam (2004) Present System (2000) Regressions based on existing expen-
ditures, income level and voting power
Net:   
Togan (2004) Present System (2000) Regressions based on existing expen-
ditures, income level and voting power
Net:   
Hughes (2004) Present System Between
2015 and 2017
Comparable amounts (per capita) as
Bulgaria and Romania and 4% GDP
ceiling for structural funds
Gross: starting from    
2015 to  	   

European Com-
mission DG-
Agriculture (2004)
Present System (2004) Calculation according to the present
rules
Gross: agricultural expenditures
alone   
Grethe (2004) Present System and Re-
form Scenario in 2014
Model Simulation Status Quo, Net 2014:  
	 
CAP Reform, Net:   
Zft Present System (2001) Calculated according to EU-15 member
states’ shares of expenditures and
payments
Net:   
Dervis, Emerson,
Gros, Ülgen (2004)
Present System (2001) CAP-costs comparable share of value
added; structural funds 4% ceiling
Net transfers 2015:   
Turkish migration potential is high.
Massive income differences, especially with Turkey’s less developed regions, and existing
networks (around 2.5 million Turks are resident in Germany), mean that the migration poten-
tial from Turkey to Germany is considerable. On the basis of a model by Sinn and Flaig, our
estimate is for an additional 4.4 million from 2013, using this as a possible EU-entry date.
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This should be treated as an upper limit. A halving of the income differential would reduce
this to about 1.3 million.
Long-term transition periods, or a permanent safeguard clause currently proposed by the
Commission in the area of free movement for persons, will result. Even with a population re-
duction in the current EU, the qualification profile (generally low levels) of the Turkish la-
bour force does not correspond to European demands. Some integration difficulties associated
with Turks already in Europe, before all in Germany, are also apparent. Immigration does not
solve the problem of ageing (and linked pressures on the social system) in European core
countries (see figure 5), because the reproduction levels of migrants adapt to the new context.
These are reasons why projected positive welfare effects through the migration of Turks to
Germany (Brücker 2004) are unlikely to materialise. However, if demographic change
stimulates additional demand for labour in Germany, then a selective immigration policy
would be the appropriate tool and not a general liberalisation of migration.
Table 18: Migration Potential from Turkey to the EU-15 and Germany
Study Method Migration Potential
Lejour et. al. (2004) Migration elasticities from other studies applied to
projected Turkish GDP
To EU-15: 2.7 Mill.
Hughes (2004) DIW model (Alvarez-Plata, Brücker and Siliver-
stovs 2003) adapted for Turkey
To EU-15: starting at 225,000 per year with a total
stock of 2.9 Mill.
Flam (2004) DIW model (Boeri and Brücker 2000) To Germany over 30 years:
No convergence: 2.7 Mill.
2% convergence: 1.3 Mill.
Togan (2004) DIW model (Boeri and Brücker 2000) To Germany up to 2030: 1.5 Mill.
Quaisser and Rep-
pegather (2004)
Sinn and Flaig (2001) model To Germany from 2013: 4.4 Mill. Will decrease to
1.3 Mill. if the income difference is halved
Figure 5: Demographic Trends in Germany, France and Turkey
(Population in Millions)
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Source: UN World Population Prospects; Statistisches Bundesamt 2004
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Movement towards monetary union should proceed cautiously and joining the Euro
should remain optional.
Entry to the EU does not mean immediate membership in the currency union, although due to
the present treaty arrangements it is requisite in the long-term. Turkey does not meet any of
the Maastricht criteria, though progress in monetary stabilisation, which could continue in the
coming years, can be noted. In this respect, many transformation countries had similar experi-
ences at the outset of the accession process.
The fundamental question, however, is whether in such a heterogeneous economic area it
is sensible to demand that Turkey (as a current acquis obligation) pursues a rapid fulfilment
of the Maastricht criteria and participation in EMU. The advantage of a faster linkage to or
acceptance of the Euro is the import of credibility that would result. Interest rates would sink
and higher FDI (a weak point in Turkish development) would be attracted. Admittedly, tran-
sition countries have higher inflation rates because of structural adaptation processes. Bal-
anced against this, an orientation to the Maastricht criteria too early could lead to a restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy with negative consequences for the Turkish economy. The EU
would be well advised to refrain from forcing an integration of Turkey into EMU or alterna-
tively enable a medium and long-term ‘opting-out’ mechanism.
Table 19: Compliance with the Maastricht Criteria
Long-term
interest rates
in percent1
Inflation
in percent2
Fiscal bal-
ance as
percent of
GDP3
Public debt
as percent
of GDP3
Currency exchange rate regime
Maastricht Criteria
Ref. (7.5)5 Ref. (2.0)5 -3.0 60.0 EMS-II System4/Deviation from parity: plus or
minus 15%
Euro zone 2003 (estimates)
4.1
Ref. (6.3)6
2.1
Ref. (2.5)6
-2.7 70.6 Three steps to Currency Union, starting 1 Jan.
1999  fixed exchange rate; Jan. 2002 introduc-
tion of the euro as cash
Candidates
Bulgaria 4.5 2.3 0 53.7 Currency Board (Euro)
Romania 18.2 15.3 -2.3 26.3 Managed Float (US$)
Turkey 42.8 25.3 -8.8 87.4 Float
Group Averages
NMCs8 5.5 2.9 -4.5 39.9 Different exchange rate regimes: Currency
Board (Estonia), Crawling peg (Hungary) to
Managed Float (Slovenia)
Candidate-28 11.4 15.3 -2.3 40.0 Currency Board (Bulgaria); Managed Float Ro-
mania (USD)
EU-South
19908
15.0 10.2 -8.3 75.6 EMS (European Monetary System)
EU-South
20038
4.47 3.2 -1,9 71.0 Euro
1 For the euro zone and, if available, for the NMCs, interest rates for ten-year state bonds; shorter maturities taken for Estonia.
2 Harmonised consumer goods price index. 3 Definitions might differ from those of the EU. 4 EMS: European Monetary System.
5For interest rates, maximum of two percentage points above the best performers; for inflation, maximum of 1.5 percentage
points above the best performers; reference values during the euro introduction (beginning 1999). 6 Reference values for 2003. 7
December 2003; 8 Unweighted averages. Sources: European Central Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank; Gros (2000)
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9. From ‘Privileged Partnership’ to ‘Extended Associate Membership’
In view of the vast geographic extension that accompanied its most recent increase in mem-
bership, the question of where the EU’s borders actually lie has intensified. In early 2003 the
Commission developed a strategy termed ‘Wider Europe’ involving the proposed construction
of a ‘Ring of Friends’, that is, around the EU (Lippert 2004). Javier Solana reprised this at the
Thessaloniki summit with the formulation: a ‘ring of well-governed countries…with whom
we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’ (Commission 2003a; Batt et. al. 2003). This
strategy coincides with an emergent ambivalence about the EU’s purpose, ambitions and ca-
pacities, an ambivalence that can be expected to intensify. In cooperation with the ‘EU-Outs’,
the ‘Wider Europe’ strategy proposes to form concentric circles of differentiated integration,
which in the economic field could include an extended European Economic Area (EEA), free
trade, customs union, and unified standards and norms. Differentiation is the operative princi-
ple: the relationship of neighbouring states will be ‘tailored’ to each specific case.
Implicitly, this strategy involves the drawing up of the EU’s borders. In the framework of
this concept, countries below the threshold of EU membership (such as Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus and those of the Maghreb) will be associated in a differentiated form. They
are distinguished from others (Balkans, Turkey) towards whom the EU has taken on special
obligations. Taking the very variable situations and problems into account, a flexible, differ-
entiated strategy is required. Simultaneously the question ‘what stage of integration should
these countries terminate at?’ is justifiable. For several of them (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus),
full membership is neither a reliable ‘European anchor’ nor a realistic objective in the fore-
seeable future. These countries are far from fulfilling any requirements to even to start nego-
tiations. For others, like Turkey, the EU may be not be prepared to cope with their member-
ship. Turkey may be the first case for which the EU develops a special relationship that could
also serve as a flexibly interpreted model for other ‘strategic partners’.
9.1. The Rapid Commencement of Entry Negotiations is Risky
The beginning of entry negotiations with Turkey sooner rather than later comes with major
risks attached. Previous experiences cause serious doubts about the EU’s reform capacity and
the magnitude required could plunge the EU into a deep crisis that paralyses it for years. This
may occur if the new constitutional treaty is rejected by a single national parliament or in a
referendum. A Turkish entry would then be pushed further back and stimulate another round
of bitter disappointment. Various transition periods and exceptions to the rules (restrictions on
free movement of people, delayed integration into disbursement programs) can also be ex-
pected. This raises the question of just how advantageous, in the short and medium-term, a
perspective of full membership for Turkey would actually be.
Weighed against this, a EU perspective for Turkey would increase Europe’s credibility in a
country that has had associate status for many decades. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the
nature of the promise given to Turkey in 1963, in the middle of the Cold War and concerning
participation in a customs and economic union, is to be evaluated differently than the decision
at the Helsinki summit in 1999 (candidate status for membership of the European Union).
According to witnesses, this ‘historic’ decision on the future configuration of Europe was
made in three minutes. A public debate on the external borders of Europe was avoided. This
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perfunctory action by the heads of state and government compelled the EU to enter into a
qualitatively different negotiation agenda with Turkey.
Box 1: Extended Associated Membership (EAM)
The concept of an ‘Extended Associated Membership’ builds on and clarifies that of a ‘privileged partnership’. It
offers targeted countries a clear and attractive alternative. EAM includes:
• Full participation in an ‘Extended European Economic Area’ (EEEA) based on the existing EEA (see Box
2). This means incorporation into the internal market with all regulations applying. Certain specific sectors
might be excluded. Labour market access would be restricted and specially tailored treaty clauses would be
negotiated.
• The institutional setting and coordinating mechanism of the EAM extends that of the EEA (see figures 6 and
7). A special council for EDSP coordination has to be established.
• Participation in EU Council meetings with opportunity to present positions. Voting rights would not apply.
• EAM goes beyond the EEA concept as it also represents a custom union. EAM members have a right of
consultation regarding the EU’s position in trade negotiations.
• Support programs principally in the structural and cohesion policy area (including rural development). Agri-
culture (CAP) would be excluded.
• A special senate of the European Court of Justice would decide on treaty transgressions and other legal
matters falling within areas agreed in the EAM.
EAM presumes a clear definition of Europe’s (and the EU’s) borders. This could involve reference to cultural,
geographic, or ‘consolidation phase necessary’ justifications (or a combination of them).
• In the first case the declaration in Article 49 of the EU-Treaty that ‘any European state can apply for mem-
bership in the EU’ would have a cultural interpretation with which Turkey does not correspond.
• In the second case a geographic criterion would be applied. Over 95 % of Turkish territory lies in Asia. This
would rule out Turkey from membership as it would North Africa, Israel and other extra-European states
with which the EU has some form of special relationship.
• The third case envisages a pragmatic decision based on the need to avoid an over-extension and meltdown
of the EU’s capacities (which would not help anyone) and instead to concentrate on consolidation measures.
This would have the effect of postponing any possible Turkish EU entry far into the future. For the same
reason Russia’s full EU membership as a quasi-European state would be ruled out. For all countries men-
tioned above the EAM would be the final integration level.
If a clear definition of Europe’s borders is avoided then a more flexible approach could be applied. In this case
EAM could be alternatively considered as a final or transitional integration level. In any instance it would be
obligatory before full membership could ensue.
Yet it may also spark a different credibility crisis. Immediately upon the commencement
of negotiations, discussion on the membership of other neighbouring states, with which the
EU already has special relations, would intensify. The Rome Treaty’s Article 49 can be noted
here: ‘Any European state can apply for membership of the EU’. This was declared without
having defined what a ‘European state’ is or what it is not (Cf. Arnold 2004: 138-147). The
EU cannot withdraw from the obligations it has created for itself or, for example, from the
central security task of pacifying the Balkans. If Turkey is admitted, how could the EU refuse
Ukraine a membership perspective should it successfully fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria?
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Firstly, a cultural interpretation of Article 49 could ensue in which it was determined that
Turkey was not a ‘European’ state. Secondly, a geographic reasoning could be applied in or-
der to exclude Turkey (or Russia).7 About 95% of Turkish territory lies outside most currently
accepted geographic definitions of Europe. A rejection of North African states – should they
introduce the requisite democratic reforms and apply to join – by reference to geography
would then be relatively uncomplicated. After a Turkish entry, however, this would be harder
to justify. For countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus this argument cannot be made. An
entry of these some time in the future would also be in the foreign policy interests of the new
EU members in CEE.
9.2. ‘Privileged Partnership’ and ‘Extended Associated Membership’ as a Inte-
gration Alternatives
The proponents of a full membership for Turkey warn of the danger that may result from a
Turkish ‘refusal-shock’. The danger is exaggerated as it is in Turkey’s interest to maintain a
close relationship with the EU and in the continuation of internal reforms. Turkey needs a
European perspective but it must not necessarily be one that promises full membership.
To avoid a spatial and institutional-organisational overstretch, the EU could offer Turkey
and other strategic partners a Privileged Partnership (zu Guttenberg 2004), such as proposed
by the Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU), and also preferred by some prominent So-
cial Democrats in Germany, or an ‘Extended Associated Membership’ (EAM). This presumes
a clear definition and confirmation of the EU’s borders. Alternatively the EU’s heads of state
and government could make the fundamental decision to introduce a long consolidation phase
in which no additional enlargements would be undertaken.
A Privileged Partnership would be phased in and eventually surpass the status of special
relations (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) and normal Associate Membership.
Privileged Partnerships could be individually negotiated and include membership in the EEA
as well as particular forms of intensive political dialogue (regular summit meetings). This
concept’s main advantage is its flexibility. A disadvantage is that it appears less clear and at-
tractive than full EU membership and would presently be rejected as an alternative by the
Turkish government.
9.3. EAM Should Provide for Partial Integration in EU Political Structures and
Cohesion Policy
The EAM goes further and attempts to better define a privileged form of relations. In the eco-
nomic sphere it includes membership in an ‘Extended European Economic Area’ (EEEA).
This would mean a full expansion of the internal market (with competition rules) for all
countries concerned. Free labour movement would remain restricted and regulated in special
treaties, similarly to other ‘sensitive’ areas.
These countries would be participants in the EU internal market with all the preferences
deriving from market access, unified competition rules and through factor mobility (with re-
strictions noted above for labour). The economic effects of the EAM are then in large part
                                                
7 A potential counter-argument could be made by reference to the fact that - geographically defined - about 80 %
of Russians and about 33 % of Turks live in ‘Europe’.
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comparable with full membership. EMU is not initially foreseen but is not fundamentally ex-
cluded. Participation in the internal market means that these countries would take on most of
the acquis and must fulfil the already requisite economic criteria.
Extensive economic integration must be flanked by a partial integration in political struc-
tures and special cohesion programs. Only in this way would the EAM be a credible and at-
tractive alternative to full membership. Acceptance of the acquis brings a wide range of obli-
gations (and associated costs), which must be offset by equivalents in the political and finan-
cial areas. Partial political integration could follow in the context of enlarged EU Council
meetings in which ‘wider Europe’ would decide on pan-European issues. This would not ex-
tend to voting rights but would include rights to present opinions and proposals. Defining the
areas of competence for the enlarged EU Council would be difficult but not impossible. The
institutional setting and political coordination scheme could follow those of the EEA (see
BOX 2) but could be extended to include an intensified political dialogue and the ESDP (see
figures 6 and 7). EAM countries would also have personnel employed in the European insti-
tutions, principally the Commission. This would be compatible with and assist the ‘Wider
Europe’ strategy. Integration into EU policies would occur along with expanded support pro-
grams, before all through a newly configured cohesion policy. Participation in the CAP would
be excluded and substituted by a focus on rural development.
Box 2: The European Economic Area (EEA)
The EEA came into force on the 1st of January 2004. It includes the former EFTA countries Iceland,
Norway and Liechtenstein. In a referendum Switzerland rejected the EAA-membership in December
1992. The EEA forms a common market with the EU based on the acquis. The agreement encom-
passes an important difference to other international treaties in that ‘common rules are continuously
updated by adding new EC legislation. This aspect is essential given the large output of Community
legislation on the internal market. Each month a number of EEA-relevant pieces of legislation are in-
corporated into EEA Agreement by decision of the EEA Joint Committee.’ (EEA 2004). EFTA ex-
perts are incorporated in the decision-making process and have a right of consultation in issues con-
cerning the EEA. This differentiates it from the EU’s bilateral treaties with Switzerland. The CAP and
fisheries are not included although some issues of trade policy in these areas are mentioned. Because
the EEA is not a customs union it does not affect trade policy with other partners. The agreement goes
beyond the ‘four freedoms’ of the internal market and covers areas like research and development,
education, consumer safety, environment and social policy. The EFTA countries can participate in
designated EU programs and can influence their development and management through participation
in corresponding committees. The EEA could be characterised as a high-level free trade area that ex-
cludes participation in the political process of the EU. The case of Liechtenstein proves that flexible
solutions can be found in several fields like the free movement of labour. Influence on the EU’s inter-
nal market regulations is rather limited. Several institutions ensure a proper functioning of the EEA.
These include a Joint Committee (responsible for current implementation); the EEA-Council (con-
sisting of the foreign ministers of the EU and EFTA member states); a Joint Parliamentary Committee
(MPs of all states); and an EEA Executive Committee (member of various committees of the EU). In
addition several other regulatory organs are involved (current Committee of the EFTA-states with co-
ordinating functions; EFTA supervisory office; and a special court).
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Figure 6: Different EU Integration Paths and Stages
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Figure 7: Institutional Framework of EU and EFTA/EAM Policy Coordination
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9.4. Integration Alternatives Remain Topical
To the present Turkey has rejected any integration alternatives. This is rational in the sense of
aiming to realise maximum positions. Although there are signals that EU entry negotiations
will commence fairly rapidly, a discussion of alternatives is sensible. The process is featured
by an underlying fragility. It cannot be excluded that the political and economic imponder-
ables of a Turkish membership might lead to a change of thinking in Turkish estimations. The
conclusion may be drawn that EU membership demands too much in the way of adaptation
costs and entails excessive loss of sovereignty. This would cause an entry perspective to be
pushed far into the future.
There are also further political uncertainties. From official sources it is repeatedly empha-
sised that only the complete fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria and the adoption of the ac-
quis will determine Turkey’s acceptance or not. It must also be remembered that the accep-
tance of a country must be unanimously approved and ratified by every national parliament.
Turkey’s membership is disputed in the EU15 and it is presently open what positions will be
adopted by the NMCs. Complex EU regulations may also be responsible for delays; so too
political or economic crises in Turkey, as has often happened in the past. The Commission’s
proposal of a restricted approach reflects these fears.
9.5. Consolidation Before Enlargement
It is often forgotten that the Copenhagen Criteria also contain provisions requiring that the EU
must be capable of enlargement. We do not know what the EU will look like in ten years.
Gradual policy alterations and uncertainty about the discharging of the draft constitutional
treaty stimulate doubts about whether the EU with up to 30 members can function effectively.
A long consolidation phase is necessary cope with the eastern enlargement and to further de-
velop important economic projects (internal market, EMU, Lisbon process). In the political
area the new constitution (if it is adopted) must be tested in practice. Further reforms are re-
quired to overcome insufficient institutional structures, the democratic deficit, and the com-
plicated treaty and regulatory domains. A division of competences must be clarified and thor-
oughgoing changes in agricultural and structural policies introduced in order to avoid finan-
cial and structural collapse. If this does not happen, negotiations with Turkey would be de-
layed and ultimately arrive at a ‘membership second class’ with limited integration in key EU
policy areas. Because of the striking income difference the free movement of labour must in
many instances be restricted by long-term and flexible transition rules.
On the other hand the EU is endangered by a retreat from the ‘solidarity’ principle of inter-
est equalisation. Because financial redistribution is losing importance as the principal linkage
in the European decision process, political compromises will be ever more difficult. Increas-
ing economic heterogeneity will make a unified economic and monetary policy harder to at-
tain and would entail different starting points for different groups of states. Conceptualising
and conducting a CFSP will not be any simpler; a larger group of states with different prefer-
ences in this area now participate in its formulation. This is especially pertinent for Turkey,
which borders on many conflict regions. There is a danger that different integration levels and
shifting alliances will arise, which formally or informally draw variable decision-making
mechanisms to themselves. In such a situation considerable technical, organisational, and be-
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fore all political problems, are likely. As a result the EU would become a club of varied
memberships, hardly different to the ‘Extended Associate Membership’.
Table 20: Necessary EU Reforms before Turkey can Enter the Union
Policy Areas Policy reforms, actions and problems
Agriculture Co-financing of direct income transfers for farmers; Commission concentrates on market supervi-
sion and competition
Cohesion Policy Concentration of transfers to poorer member states; regional policy returned to the national level;
Commission to monitor national policy approaches
Financing and expendi-
tures
The budgetary system has to be transformed to become fair and transparent; the British rebate
has to be abolished; a new mechanism for financial transfers has to be found
Internal Market Regulations of the acquis have to be streamlined and simplified; free movement of labour has to
be restricted
EMU No automatic obligation to join EMU
Lisbon Process Coordinated action of major EU economies; Commission’s role limited to organising the dialogue
EDSP Better coordination needed; enhanced cooperation extended; more funding required
Policy coordination Different types of formal and informal policy coordination have to be developed according to dif-
ferent integration levels
In the face of such a scenario the question is posed whether the EU, as a strategic actor, can
summon the strength necessary to make a quantum leap that would enable it to become a
partner of the USA in global security. For German foreign policy, the idea of ‘political union’
(hidden behind the formulation ‘Core Europe’), which was once a precondition for the
sustainability of EMU, is now apparently being backed away from. If Europe wants to think
‘global’ or even ‘continental’, improve its competitiveness, and provide a major contribution
to international security, then political and economic integration must be advanced. If not the
EU will remain a looser ‘union of states’. ‘Size’ alone does not equate with ‘strength’, neither
internally nor when directed externally.
An accession process with Turkey, and possibly other states (Balkans, Ukraine, Moldavia),
may as a consequence intensify endeavours by a core group of EU members oriented to
strengthening political, economic and military cooperation. Expressed another way, the cen-
trifugal forces of the European unification process (enlargement or ‘widening’) could give a
powerful stimulus to a counter movement of important European countries to form a ‘core
Europe’ focused on ‘deepening’ integration. The possibility of this occurring is present within
the framework of the new constitutional treaty. If others were to block this ‘core Europe’ pro-
cess, then new (intergovernmental) integration concepts would be pursued. Interstate coordi-
nation (bilateral/trilateral/quadrilateral) would increase and changing integration cores, vari-
able according to national interests, would form. Not more, rather less security in Europe,
could result.
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Table 21: EU Integration Levels and Association Strategies
Integration Level
and Target
Requirements Economic Integration Institutions and
Politics
Financial Programs
PCAs
Target: not defined;
may end in EAA
Not necessary full market
economy and democratic
legal order according to
EU-standards but should
be approached; ‘Copenha-
gen Criteria light’
Non-preferential treatment
in trade
Economic cooperation
Intermittent political dia-
logue
Suspension clause
Tacis
FTAs (Associ-
ated Status)
Target: not defined;
may end in EAA
‘Copenhagen Criteria
light’: legislation should be
approximate to the that of
the Internal Market
Preferential treatment in
trade; should be extended
to services
Committees, political and
security dialog; coopera-
tion in transport, energy;
support for WTO-
membership
Meda, MFA
SAAs (Associ-
ated Status)
Vague target: full
EU-Membership
Objective: Market Econ-
omy, Copenhagen Criteria;
regional co-operation;
monitoring
Free Trade, partial adop-
tion of the acquis
Association and Stabilisa-
tion council; Committees
on different issues; inter-
mittent political dialogue
CARDS
Bilateral treaties
(Switzerland) Tar-
get: not defined;
short-term: associa-
tion agreement;
long-term: full EU-
membership
Market economy; Demo-
cratic legal order; Partial
adoption of EU legal
norms
Partial integration in Euro-
pean Economic Area
(EEA), Preferential
Agreements, Schengen
Intermittent political dia-
logue, technical dialogue
Integration in some EU
programs; contributions to
cohesion funds
EAA
Target: not defined,
may end in full EU-
membership
Market Economy and De-
mocracy
Internal Market: Four
Freedoms: goods, capital,
labour (restricted), services
Several special institutions
(i.e. joint committee, coun-
cils, supervisory organisa-
tion, special court)
Partial Integration in EU
Policies; contributions to
cohesion funds
Europe Agree-
ment (associated
status)
Target: Full EU-
Membership (no
clear legal commit-
ment)
Phased adoption of Copen-
hagen Criteria (democracy,
human rights, market
economy, competitiveness
capacity) and acquis;
Monitoring Process
Preferential trade agree-
ments; phased liberalisa-
tion up to free trade and
capital mobility;  free
movement of labour ex-
cluded
Association Council; Ac-
cession Partnerships; In-
tensive regular political
dialogue
Pre-entry assistance (e.g.
PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA)
‘Privileged Part-
nership’
Target: Associate
status extended to
several areas – final
stage
Market economy; demo-
cratic legal order; competi-
tiveness capacity; selected
areas of the acquis
Customs Union; selected
areas of liberalisation in
the field of services; labour
excluded
Association Council ex-
tended; (sub-committees in
several fields); Intensive
regular political dialogue
Close cooperation in ESDP
Individual support pro-
grams
Extended Asso-
ciate Member-
ship (Authors’
proposal):
Target: Final inte-
gration level but full
membership not
excluded
Realisation of the Copen-
hagen Criteria and most
parts of the acquis before
membership monitoring
process
EEA, custom union in-
cluding internal market;
free movement of labour
excluded (but partial liber-
alisation possible); EMU
optional
Participation in the deci-
sion-making structures of
the EEA (Joint Commit-
tee). Partial integration in
EU political structures;
Intense cooperation in
ESDP
Partial integration in EU
structural and cohesion
policies, payments into
these funds
Full EU
Membership
Realisation of acquis and
Copenhagen Criteria
Schengen obligations
Internal market
EMU
Full  rights of a member
state; Schengen obligations
CFSP,  ESDP
Full integration in EU poli-
cies (possible transition
periods)
Explanations: PCAs: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova; FTAs: Free Trade Agree-
ments within the Barcelona-Process. They include Association Agreements with Southern Mediterranean and North-African
Countries; SAAs: Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) ends in Agreement (SAA). Includes Croatia, Macedonia, Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia; Associate Membership: Europe Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania. Association Agreement
with Turkey since 1963. Source: Authors’ conception
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List of Abbreviations
acquis: Acquis Communautaire
AKP Justice and Development Party
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs Central and East European Countries
CEES: Common European Economic Space initiative (EU / Russia)
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
DIS: Direct Income Support
EAM: Extended Associate Membership
EEEA: Extended European Economic Area
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EMU: European Monetary Union
EP: European Parliament
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FTA: Free Trade Agreement
GCI: Growth Competitiveness Index
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
HDI Human Development Index
IMF: International Monetary Fund
INTERREG: Inter-regional programme aiming to stimulate cooperation within the EU
JHA: Justice and Home Affairs
Meda: Community assistance programme for Mediterranean countries
MFA: Macro-financial assistance
NIS: Newly Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan)
NMCs: New Member Countries
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
Phare: Pologne, Hongrie Aide a la Reconstruction Économique
(Assistance programme for the Central European candidate countries)
Tacis: Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TENs: Trans-European Networks
UN: United Nations
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO: World Trade Organisation
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